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Abstract 
The Economics of Political Participation and Distribution in Fisheries Management 
by 
Sara Anne Sutherland 
 
Economists have characterized efficient policy remedies for market failures, but 
inefficient institutions persist. Efficient institutions fail to emerge due to high transaction 
costs in policy formation, political constraints (in private ordering), and misaligned 
incentives. Similarly, reducing the “transaction costs” and time required to create and 
implement regulations requires knowledge of the behavioral responses of stakeholders to 
proposed policies. I examine political and behavioral explanations for the persistence of 
inefficient management using a mix of theoretical and empirical approaches. 
The first chapter of my dissertation “Empirical Evidence on the Economics of 
Stakeholder Opposition to Fishery Rights-Based Management” is an empirical analysis of 
the resource users’ response to the proposed implementation of Individual Tradable Quotas 
(ITQs) in the Alaskan Sablefish and Halibut Fisheries. I examine the role of stakeholder 
participation in the formation of fisheries policy, and how fisher characteristics can be used 
to predict their position on policy adoption. Chapter two, “The Decision to Participate: The 
Role of Influence and Cost in Stakeholder Participation in the Formation of the Public 
Policy.” is a collaboration with Paulina Oliva from UCSB Economics Dept. This chapter 
addresses what motivates individuals to participate in the political process of natural 
resource management. The final chapter of my dissertation “An Empirical Examination of 
the Downstream Effect of Fishery Rationalization on Communities” is very complementary 
  vii 
to chapter one in that it asks the questions: what are the downstream effects of rights based 
management?; and is this an explanation for opposition? This paper is a collaboration with 
Eric Edwards at Utah State. 
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Chapter I 
 
Empirical evidence on the role of distribution in determining level of policy support 
 
Sara A. Sutherland 
 
Abstract: 
Economists have characterized efficient policy remedies for market failures, but 
inefficient institutions persist. When changes in policy also result in a change in distribution 
of wealth, even the most efficient policies can be politically infeasible. In many settings, 
successful policy adoption requires a trade-off between efficiency and distribution. In a 
common pool resource setting, the transition to secure, tradeable property rights can be 
economically beneficial and improve the health of the resource, but is often met with 
resistance. Individual transferrable quotas (ITQ), have encountered a considerable amount 
political opposition despite their well-documented improvements of harvesting efficiency 
and fishery health. This paper provides an empirical examination of the role of distributional 
concerns that influence an agent’s preference for a proposed change in the Alaskan sablefish 
(blackcod) and halibut fisheries. I construct a data set of consisting of nearly 4,000 public 
political participation records regarding ITQ implementation in the Alaska halibut and 
sablefish fisheries. I use a novel individual level dataset of public comments and catch data 
to test whether fishers who show that the allocation of catch influences whether a person or 
entity is in favor of the policy.  
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 “There are still ocean cowboys around who feel this is the last frontier. They think that 
anybody should have a right to fish, no matter what it does to the resource and whether or 
not it makes good economic sense.” – Walter Pereya, Seattle Seafood Processor1 
I. Introduction 
 Economists have characterized efficient policy remedies for common pool resources 
(taxes, cap and trade, etc.), but inefficient institutions persist. When changes in policy also 
result in a change in the distribution of wealth, even the most efficient policies can be 
politically infeasible. As a consequence of distributional concerns, policy design tends to 
trade-off between efficiency and distribution. In the context of implementing property rights 
based management for natural resources (e.g. fisheries, pollution), the initial allocation of 
rights may not impact economic efficiency (Coase, 1960), but can have a significant impact 
on distributive equity amongst stakeholders and therefore could influence whether or not the 
policy is adopted. 
Many environmental and natural resources remain characterized by insecure property 
rights and open access conditions despite large potential gains from increased institutional 
control. One of the most extreme examples of inefficient resource use is in fisheries, where 
there are an estimated $50 billion in losses worldwide each year (Costello et al. 2016). A 
2004 study by the FAO (2009) found that better management could alleviate losses by up to 
50% of current fishery revenues (via Arnason, 2012).2 As of 2015, there were 15 property 
rights based management programs in place in the United States (NMFS, 2015), but many 
                                                
1 May 11, 1989. San Jose Mercury News. 
2 The study by the World Bank and FAO (2009) found that in 2004 the global ocean fishery operated at a 
significant net economic loss financed in part by government subsidies. 
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fisheries are still managed using command and control methods. Many fisheries are 
managed under regulated open access conditions where rules restrict season length, gear 
type, and other methods of harvesting. These types of rules have been characterized as 
“regulation by inefficiency” because they promote a race to fish wherein overcapitalization 
is combined with high-cost and dangerous fishing practices. There is compelling and 
increasing evidence that property rights based management, the movement of a fishery to 
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), improves both the economic and ecological health of 
a fishery (Arnason 1997; Grafton 1996; Dewees 1998; Danielsson 2000; Clark 1980; 
Costello, Gaines, and Lynham 2008). Yet inefficient management persists. 
The difficulties of transitioning out of an inefficient management regime are linked to 
the cost of the process by which a new institution is created and adopted (Libecap 1989; 
1993). A large amount of political resistance can result in delays or even stop the policy 
formation and adoption process. Political resistance to cap and trade policies, like ITQs, can 
be disaggregated into three main stages: capping, allocation, and trading (Heinmiller, 2007). 
The primary focus of this paper is political resistance at the allocation level. Understanding 
the distributional issues that determine opposition may allow policymakers to better design 
politically feasible property-rights based resource management programs. 
 In the context of US fisheries, decisions about resource management are mandated by 
the Administrative Procedure Act to incorporate stakeholder input (Turner et al, 2005).3 It is 
                                                
3The Administrative Procedure Act requires that all U.S. federal regulatory agencies “shall give interested 
persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or 
arguments with or without the opportunity for oral presentation” (Title 5 U.S. Code Section 553(c), 1988 
edition). In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental Protection Agency (1991) the Supreme Court showed its 
willingness to require that public opinion be adequately consulted. (In this case, the court vacated proposed 
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apparent that political opposition has halted or delayed many resource management 
programs in the United States. When Congress reauthorized the primary law governing 
fisheries management in US federal waters, the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA, 1976) in 
1996, political pressure from the processing industry and other equity concerns led to the 
issuance of a 6-year moratorium on the creation of new ITQ programs (Guide to U.S. 
Environmental Policy). Prior to the MSA reauthorization, Alaskan Pollock harvesters 
attempted to strengthen the institutions governing the fishery, but political protests from 
processors halted any new or pending plans to change management regimes in a way that 
allocated rights to individual harvesters.  
In the formation of some of the earliest US ITQ programs, concern for small-scale 
fishermen and the takeover of fisheries by big business were cited as reasons for opposition. 
The concern has been publically acknowledged as a potential outcome from ITQs in 
congressional testimony.4 Public opposition to ITQ systems is not limited to the United 
States. The Icelandic Cod Quota system, implemented in 1983, resulted in sweeping 
concentration of the fleet and the public naming the quota holders “Lords of the Sea” 
(Helgason, 1996). In Canada, opposition to ITQs has been so strong that one parliamentary 
                                                                                                                                                 
regulation because the Environmental Protection Agency prematurely ended public hearings and deprived the 
public of sufficient opportunity to “comment [on], analyse, and influence the [regulatory] proceedings” 
4Rolland Schmitten. Assistant Administrator for Fisheries at the National Marine Fisheries Service in 
answering questions in congressional testimony in 1994: “Do ITQs promote ‘big-business’ as large companies 
have resources to buy or lease a significant amount of shares? This could happen, as experienced with grocery 
stores, agriculture, and other such enterprises… To the extent that larger firms are relatively better capitalized, 
they may be able to obtain more shares relative to their needs for efficient operation than could smaller firms.”  
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committee in Ottawa went so far as to argue that evidence for New Zealand and Australia’s 
ITQ systems shouldn’t be used to justify Canada’s use of ITQs (Mctaggart et al. 2003).  
This paper explores the economics of political resistance to ITQ adoption. In changing 
the property right allocation from the status quo, some users may see net losses even if the 
overall gains are large. Other users do not foresee future losses but instead see opportunity 
to increase their share by holding out. These users may delay or prevent the adoption of a 
welfare-enhancing institution (Matulich and Sever, 1999). While this has been the case in 
the evolution of many ITQ programs in the United States and other countries, there is 
limited understanding of the specific economic factors which determine stakeholder position 
on ITQ and other property rights based management programs.  
Prior research shows how ITQ design affects the distribution of benefits among and 
within sectors (Matulich and Sever, 1999; Costello and Grainger, 2015; Costello, 2015). 
This paper tests whether the distribution of benefits explains opposition using data from the 
adoption of the Alaskan Halibut and Sablefish ITQ program. The adoption of the Alaskan 
Halibut and Sablefish ITQ in 1995 culminated fourteen years of deliberations. As such, the 
program development process was noted as being “enormously complicated and 
controversial” with “extremely painful” deliberations (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997). In both 
fisheries, quota was allocated based on historic catch. Given the same catch pre- and post-
ITQ, a harvester is expected to be at least as well off, in terms of catch, under the ITQ 
regime. Allocation is contentious when harvesters do not believe the initial allocation 
formula provides them an equivalent catch in the future as would occur under status quo 
management. For instance, individuals with inconsistent participation history in a fishery 
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may receive an initial quota lower than what was actually caught in any year in which they 
participated. 
This paper links political opposition due to allocative concerns to fisherman 
characteristics: parties from remote communities, harvesters with high volatility in landings, 
and low volume fishermen. ITQ programs were implemented in the Alaskan Halibut and 
Sablefish fisheries simultaneously in 1995. I exploit differences in the locations and 
characteristics of harvesters and other stakeholders to disentangle the underlying economics 
of opposition. I construct a unique dataset by coding available public comments made 
between 1987 and 1992. Public comments are in the form of oral testimony and written 
communication. This time period captures the initial reaction to the ITQ management 
proposals and is the time period where all major modifications were made to the ITQ/fishery 
management plan. The names of commentators are linked to individual characteristics, 
including location, vessel ownership and landings data. The combined data are used to 
statistically test the role of participation history and location in determining levels of support 
for ITQ implementation. Results show that being a vessel owner increases the likelihood of 
being in favor of ITQs by 30 percentage points, while being located in a remote location 
decreases likelihood of being supporting ITQs by about 30 percentage points. Larger 
harvesters are more likely to be in favor of ITQs and variation in annual landings is 
negatively related to ITQ support. 
Identifying and quantifying the underlying reasons certain harvesters, remote community 
members, and industry members may lose under certain policy designs can assist in the 
design of management institutions, reduce the amount of opposition and the length of time 
to implementation, and improve overall implementation efficiency. Understanding 
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opposition allows policy to be designed to achieve a variety of social goals. For instance, to 
achieve the most effective design incorporating benefits to fishing communities, rights can 
be allocated to fishing cooperatives or fishing ports, rather than to individual fishermen 
(Costello, 2014). In this paper, I demonstrate how the institutional setting in which policy is 
implemented affects the distribution of benefits and hence political support. This paper 
highlights the trade-off between efficiency and distribution necessary to achieve political 
feasibility.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides background on ITQs and the role 
of public input in the formation of fisheries management in the United States; Section III 
provides a detailed breakdown of the distribution of costs and benefits and develops testable 
predictions; Section IV describes the data and empirical design; Section V provides the 
results of the statistical analysis; concluding remarks follow. 
I. Background 
Changes under Fishery Rationalization 
The implementation of ITQs has been linked to political opposition attributable to the 
redistribution of rents under the new regime (Matulich et al 1996). The fisheries examined in 
this paper transitioned to ITQ management from regulated open access management. Under 
regulated open access management, command and control regulations, such as vessel size 
restrictions, gear restrictions, and season limitations dominate. Such regulations result in a 
“derby style” fishery associated with a great deal of inefficiency as well as safety concerns. 
A derby fishery is typically characterized by a large, and often times unrestricted, number of 
vessels operating during a short time period. As more vessels enter the fishery, regulators 
shorten the season to avoid overfishing. The consequences of derby fishing on safety are 
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severe: “[p]eople went out in bad weather, boats were overloaded, and crews worked to 
exhaustion (Woodfurd, 2016).” 
One of the major steps towards property rights based management of a fishery is 
determining who has the right to fish. Similar to cap and trade programs aimed at controlling 
pollution, harvesting rights are typically allocated by grandfathering where harvesters 
receive a certain percentage of that year’s catch based on average historic catch. When a 
grandfathering scheme is used, allocation is contentious because individuals prefer the time 
period when their harvest levels were greatest (Grainger and Parker 2013). 
The adoption of property rights hinges on the acceptance by the resource users and other 
stakeholders. As stated by Hanneson (2004): “those who expect to gain will promote the 
new institution, those who expect to lose will fight with equal or greater vigor.” 
Stakeholders demand a voice in the process of defining and allocating rights, which often 
times results in “delays, ambiguities, and transaction costs (Colby, 2000),” but the extent to 
which distribution determines a stakeholder’s position has been largely overlooked in 
economic literature. 
Overall efficiency gains associated with ITQs are large, but vessel owners may oppose if 
they prefer alternative management techniques or believe they will fare better under status 
quo management. As Costello and Grainger (2015) point out, the inframarginal rent enjoyed 
by high skill resource users may, upon the transition to property rights, be capitalized into 
asset values and transferred to all permit owners. However, they also find that as long as the 
initial allocation is at least 30% of historic catch, all users will be better off. Guyader and 
Thebaud (2000) find that many harvesters have preferences for input regulations such as 
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gear restrictions, which are perceived to give equal opportunity to all participants and award 
the most skillful.  
This paper suggests that opposition to ITQs can be traced to the institutional setting in 
which individual fishing quota is allocated and the resulting distribution of benefits. 
Grandfathering of quota results in relatively lower gains (or even losses) to vessel owners 
with inconsistent vessel landings. When quota is grandfathered, newer participants or 
participants missing a year or more of fishing, will receive a percentage of quota lower than 
their actual catch in any given participating year. Individuals displaying higher variation in 
annual landings due to exogenous shocks (broken arm, etc.) may feel their allocation under 
grandfathering is not reflective of their actual skill level. Both absent and inconsistent vessel 
owners may object to or delay property rights adoption until the calculation of quota share 
reflects internal beliefs about future landings potential. In other words, a harvester may try 
to delay ITQ implementation if she thinks average harvest will increase over time, and past 
harvest is not reflective of future potential harvest.  
Differential valuation of expected future catch by individuals relative to the 
grandfathering allocation scheme is analogous to the process of unitizing oil fields. Oil lease 
production is influenced by firm management policies, details of which are not publically 
available. This leads to internal calculations of lease value that differ from value calculations 
that are made using publically available data. If a firm believes the estimated lease values 
calculated using public information are too low, or that delay will reveal new information 
leading to a larger allocation, the firm will object to unitization (Libecap & Wiggins, 1985). 
In the case of the fishery, if a vessel owner believes historic landings data is not reflective of 
future earning potential, the vessel owner may object to and delay rationalization. Libecap 
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and Wiggins (1985) also point out that a firm may resist joining if holding out will result in 
concession from other parties.  
Community Incentives 
ITQs can result in changes in fleet size and the timing and location of landings. When 
landings move from one port to another, factor markets must also move. Many remote 
Alaskan communities serve as factor markets for the fishing industry, providing fish 
processing, boat and dock services, and points of sale for fish. Most economic analysis of 
fisheries management has assumed that individuals act as autonomous agents, maximizing 
profit under budget constraints (Guyader, & Thebaud, 2000). However, residents of coastal 
communities worry about the effect of fleet consolidation on non-harvesting employment 
and economic activity (Reimer, Abbott, Wilen, 2013 8, 16-19).  ITQs generate rents through 
the elimination of excess capital and consolidation of harvest to the most efficient vessels 
(Reimer, Abbott, Wilen (1-4)). Fleet consolidation results in a reduction in the total number 
of crew jobs, although the remaining jobs are more consistent and over a longer season 
(Abbott & Wilen, 2010). The Canadian Halibut fishery experienced a reduction in the 
number of crew employed on active vessels and a consolidation of the fleet after ITQs were 
implemented. These two effects resulted in a 32% decrease in employment (Abbott & 
Wilen, 2010).  
The degree to which adverse impacts may occur depends on the relative importance of 
the fishery to the community’s local economy (Stewart, 2006). Many small communities 
rely on the small-boat fleet and processing industry as a source of local employment. Jobs 
created by local fishery resources include crew positions, as well as downstream fishery 
industries including cannery production, and vessel equipment, supply and repair business. 
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Members of small communities participating in Alaskan fisheries may receive allocations of 
fishing rights in line or above historic harvest levels, but the concern for coastal 
communities persists, particularly those in remote rural areas.  
Fisheries Management and Public Input 
 Public input plays an important role in the formation of US fishery regulation. In the 
United States, regional fishery management councils have considerable power in fishery 
management decisions. The methods used by fishery councils to make decisions and solicit 
public comment provide the key data source for this paper and here this process is discussed 
in detail. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC), which regulates the 
Alaskan sablefish and halibut fisheries, consists of eleven voting members including seven 
private citizens—five from Alaska and two from Washington— appointed by the Secretary 
of Commerce from lists submitted by the Governors of Alaska and Washington.5 Council 
members appointed by governors may have electoral accountability if reappointment to the 
council is dependent upon public satisfaction with their performance, and this can result in 
council members voting for politically favorable or neutral policies.  
The fishery management council makes decisions under the authority of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act (1976). The council is able to modify and create a fishery management plan 
(FMP) for fisheries within its jurisdiction.  FMPs characterize the way a fishery is managed 
and changes to management (amendments) are considered by the council at each meeting. 
The council composition is designed so that all stakeholder groups are represented. Meetings 
are open to public comments—written, emailed and oral—and council decisions are made 
                                                
5 The council also includes four non-voting members representing the Pacific States Marine Fisheries 
Commission, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Department of State, and the Coast Guard. 
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by recorded vote in a public forum. After the council has voted, the final decision is sent for 
a second review to the Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary receives further public 
comment, and if approved, the Council makes the decision final.6 Minimum time for 
regulatory change is over a year, with duration increasing if the regulation is complex or 
contentious. In the United States, the incubation period for ITQ policy has ranged anywhere 
from 1 year to 17 years (author’s calculations). In the late-1980s and early-1990s the 
NPFMC floated proposals for ITQs for five fisheries under their jurisdiction: halibut (1988) 
and sablefish (1987); Bering Sea and Aleutian Island crab (1991); Pollock (1990); Non-
Pollock Groundfish (1991); and Rockfish (1991). These proposals were opened to public 
comment and comments were solicited via meetings and letters until ITQ adoption. The first 
ITQ scheme was adopted in the halibut and sablefish fisheries in 1995.  
 Individual Transferrable Quotas (ITQs) were first proposed as potential management 
methods for Alaskan Sablefish and Halibut in 1987 and 1988, respectively7. ITQs offer net 
gains to resource users, but face pushback from the general public, vessel owners, and 
industry members. The contentious nature of the ITQ policy resulted in an eight year lag 
between policy proposal and its implementation. Stakeholders voiced their position on ITQ 
management at council meetings, through phone-calls, petitions, and written letters. In the 
time period studied, the fishery council met in Anchorage five times per year and received 
input from a variety of advisory groups including the science and statistical committee 
                                                
6 All rules and policies must conform to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, Endangered Species Act, Marine 
Mammal Protection Act, Regulatory Flexibility Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, executive orders, 
and other applicable law. 
7 Though limited entry had been contemplated since 1981 (NPFMC, 1997). 
  13 
(SSC), Advisory Panel (AP) and “plan teams” on the proposed fisheries policy. The AP 
consists of members representing user groups, recreational fishermen, environmentalists, 
and consumer groups. 
Between 1987 and 1992, official council meetings were held exclusively in Anchorage 
although scoping meetings were held in other cities in Alaska and Seattle. The meeting 
structure is determined by an agenda that is posted by the council. The public may propose 
changes to regulations by testifying to the AP or making a comment to the Council during 
the public comment period. These comments may be made in person at the meeting or by 
writing. At each meeting, the council members and staff receive a briefing book, which 
contains summaries of background information for each agenda item, reports and materials 
for each item, and written public comment. Between 1987 and 1992 the council received 
over 3000 letters and signatures from vessel owners and other interest groups stating their 
preferences regarding the ITQ policy.  
 
Halibut and Sablefish ITQ: Management History and Policy Design 
Commercial harvest of Halibut can be traced back to the early 1900s, and the fishery 
mostly produced fresh-fish until the 1970s (Homans & Wilen, 2000). Higher halibut prices 
in the 1970s and the implementation of limited entry programs for salmon fisheries 
contributed to the growing number of vessels entering the halibut fishery.  During the 1980s, 
the fishery experienced an influx of many larger vessels from crab fisheries as crab stocks 
declined (IPHC 1987). Even as the total allowable catch stayed steady or increased, the 
season length shortened due to increased entry (FAO, 2009). The halibut fishery 
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experienced growth when other fisheries experienced low years, and the relatively low cost 
of entry into the fishery also made the halibut attractive as a “supplemental” fishery. 
Halibut and sablefish fishermen often overlap, as both require use of longline gear and 
similar vessels. However, sablefish are harvested further off the coast at depths of 400m, 
requiring larger vessels and more specialized gear than halibut harvesting. Halibut are a 
flatfish caught in waters as shallow as 90 feet, allowing vessels as small as skiffs to harvest 
halibut close to shore. Sablefish vessels are on average larger than halibut vessels, and a few 
large vessel operators target exclusively sablefish. Most of these fishers operate vessels 60 
feet or more in length, enabling them to fish in less-protected areas, such as the Bering Sea 
and Aleutian Islands (FAO, 2009).8 
Pre-ITQ command and control regulations resulted in a race to fish in which vessels and 
gear are chosen to maximize quantity harvested in a short time period (Homens & Wilen, 
2000). This derby setting was particularly dangerous if the season opening happened to 
occur during inclement weather. Non-participation on bad-weather days would result in 
missing an entire season. Between 1980 and 1988, an average of 31 individuals died at sea 
(ADFG, 2016)9. In 1993, the mortality rate for Alaskan fishers was 34.8 per 100,000 
workers, which was 7 times the national occupational average (CDC, 1993).   
The council responded to the rapid growth and overcapitalization of the early 1980s 
halibut fishery by proposing a moratorium on entry into the fishery. The moratorium was the 
first limited entry policy proposal for Halibut, and was recommended by the NPFMC to the 
Secretary of Commerce for review under the authority of the Northern Pacific Halibut Act 
                                                
8 http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y2684e/y2684e22.htm 
9 http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=wildlifenews.view_article&articles_id=757 
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of 1982. Regulations recommended by council must be approved by the Secretary of 
Commerce, acting through NOAA and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) before 
they become law. Secretarial review, which considers federal policies and stances on 
management approaches, precedes publication of proposed federal regulations. 
The public had mixed reactions to the proposed halibut limited entry management, and 
the policy underwent substantial scrutiny by federal reviewers. In 1983, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) ruled the proposed halibut limited entry regulation to be 
inconsistent with Executive Order 1229110. Though the council directed a “plan team” to 
continue to examine limited entry for the halibut fishery, the proposal was abandoned in 
1985 and the fishery, along with its inefficiencies, continued to grow. 
Similarly, the sablefish fishery attracted an increasing number of vessels from 1980 to 
1990. The council first adopted allocative measures for sablefish in 1985, when the total 
allowable catch was split between geographic areas and gear types (NPFMC, 1997), but the 
advent of new fishing technology, increasing vessel size, and increased entry led to further 
growth of the sablefish fishery. Between 1985 and 1990 the number of sablefish harvesters 
grew from 371 to 800, and problems manifesting in the halibut fishery, such as shortened 
season, congestion externalities, and racing for fish, also plagued the sablefish fishery.  The 
eastern Gulf sablefish season decreased from 180-days in 1984 to 20 days by 1990; the 
Central Gulf fishery decreased from a 254 day season in 1984 to a 60 day season in 1990 
(Pautzke and Oliver, 1997).  
The Council began reviewing sablefish license proposals in 1987 and conducted several 
industry surveys. In the summer of 1987, the Council called for sablefish management 
                                                
10 http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12291.html 
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proposals, and, in the fall of 1987, adopted a Statement of Commitment declaring the 
Council’s intent to pursue alternative management methods for the sablefish fishery 
including strategies for license limitation or individual transferable quotas (ITQs). In 1988, 
the council voted that status quo management was not an acceptable policy and directed its 
staff to create five alternative sablefish management plans. In January 1988, the council 
directed its staff to specifically analyze ITQs and license limitations alternatives, and the 
final ruling on the preferred management method was scheduled for June 1988.  ITQs were 
a contentious topic in council meetings, and many Alaskan vocally opposed the policy. The 
council’s final decision on a preferred management option was repeatedly postponed. In 
1989, the fishery management plans were further reviewed at a public hearing, and three 
plans were selected for review and refinement over the next two years.  
In 1990, ITQs were selected as the preferred management for sablefish and the council 
also elected to include the halibut fishery in the implementation of the sablefish ITQ policy. 
By this time, there were already area and gear restrictions in place for both species, but the 
policy as proposed in 1990 would undergo many changes before the final version would be 
selected as the preferred management alternative. Many of these changes specifically 
address distributional concerns highlighted by harvester and stakeholder input. Between 
1988 and 1992, over 1,000 vessel owning halibut and sablefish harvesters expressed their 
position on the proposed ITQ policy to the Council and many voiced concerns over 
distributional impacts of ITQs on small operations, new harvesters, and small communities. 
More than 2,000 other members of the general public participated in the policy formation 
process by speaking at council meetings, writing letters, and signing petitions. 
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The ITQ program was anticipated to distribute the total allowable catch of halibut and 
sablefish. Each participant would receive quota based on documented catch from 1984 and 
1990.  Newer entrants to the fishery would receive substantially less than they currently 
were catching, while others would receive more than their current average catch. According 
to council analysis of quota recipients of shares, 5,484 halibut vessel owners would be given 
shares in the initial allocation of quota. The number of vessel owners participating in the 
halibut fishery grew from 2,479 in 1985 to 3,883 in 1990. For sablefish, the annual number 
of vessel owners ranged from 244 in 1985 to 706 in 1988. In total, 1,094 vessel owners 
received sablefish shares in the initial allocation process. 
Changes were made to the ITQ plans of both species to address distributional concerns, 
and the preferred ITQ policy was selected in the end of 1991. The structure of the ITQ 
policy varied slightly by species, but the programs were implemented simultaneously. Both 
species were allocated by area, and shares were initially allocated to vessel owners and 
leaseholders making at least one landing between 1988 and 1990 (NPFMC, 1997). The three 
year eligibility window was intended to account for exogenous negative shocks such as 
sickness, vessel damage, or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, which may have caused a fisher to be 
absent in a given year. The initial grandfathering of quota for sablefish was calculated using 
the best five of six harvest years for 1985 through 1990, and the best five out of seven years 
for 1984 through 1990, for halibut (NPFMC, 1997).   
III. Predictive Framework 
Stakeholder characteristics expected to influence level of support for ITQ policy include 
vessel ownership, stakeholder location, and production characteristics. According to the ITQ 
policy design, individuals owning and leasing vessels that participated in the sablefish and 
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halibut fishery receive quota share, a sellable asset, but crew, processors, and other industry 
members receive no quota share. The quota holder is expected to receive a greater share of 
the ITQ benefits relative to non-quota holding stakeholders. The first prediction of this 
paper: 
Prediction 1: Vessel ownership increases the probability a stakeholder is in favor of 
ITQs.  
The extent to which vessel ownership influences position on ITQs likely depends on the 
location of the stakeholder. Stakeholders in small, remote Alaskan communities have fewer 
local employment alternatives outside of fisheries. There are three common justifications for 
why remote communities may expect to benefit less from ITQs than their non-remote 
counterparts, beyond factors related to quota allocation: (i) individuals from remote 
locations may anticipate reduced market access; (ii) the wellbeing of the individual’s 
community may be a consideration (Carothers, 2000); (iii) the “culture” of remote locations 
may be one that mistrusts government or resents government control (Karpoff, 1985). The 
processing of fresh fish requires access to major port towns as fish are highly perishable and 
need to be flown to their final destination using commercial passenger planes (Interview 
with Trident Seafood). Processors located in remote areas will not be able to access the fresh 
market, but will be required to compete with fresh fish processors for raw materials. Remote 
community members could easily anticipate a diversion of fish away from their ports, as 
most fishing communities were aware of the changes that occurred when the BC halibut 
fishery rationalized a few years prior. There, the season lengthened from 5 days to 8 months 
and the amount of product sold to the fresh market increased from 42% to 94% (Casey, 
1992). Additionally, congestion externalities associated with the derby fishery may be less 
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severe in remote locations due to inaccessibility of fishing grounds. For these reasons, the 
prediction 2 relates to the location of the vessel owner or stakeholder: 
Prediction 2: Remote harvesters and stakeholders are more likely to oppose ITQs 
The second part of the predictive framework focuses on distributional impacts to vessel 
owners. Larger firms may be less sensitive to a quota share lower than expected catch, 
because they internalize more of the benefits of the more efficient institution (Wiggins and 
Libecap, 1987). Relative to a small operation, larger operations are expected to experience 
greater gains from ITQs through decreased coordination and investment costs. Higher 
average landings may indicate greater investment in the resource and hence more stake in 
the long-term stability of the resource. The following prediction summarizes this argument: 
Prediction 3: Opposition to ITQs will be decreasing in average quantity of fish landed.  
Support for ITQs is expected to be increasing in annual landings and decreasing in 
harvesting volatility. I build upon the earlier work on oil field unitization by Wiggins and 
Libecap (1985, 1987) and develop a simple, testable model of a harvester’s decision to 
oppose or support property rights in a fishery setting. When deciding whether or not to 
support property rights, the vessel owner maximizes the expected value of her quota with 
respect to the date ITQ begins, 𝑡! . The vessel owner will decide her position on ITQ 
implementation by calculating the difference between expected earnings under ITQ and 
status quo. Let 𝐸[𝑃𝑉!!"#]  and 𝐸[𝑃𝑉!!"] be harvester i’s expected present value of earnings 
under ITQ management and status quo management, respectively. If at any given date in the 
future the difference in vessel owner’s expected present value of income under ITQ 
management and status quo management is greater than zero, the vessel owner will be in 
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favor of rationalization at this time. That is, a vessel owner favors rationalization at time t* 
if and only if: 
 E PV!!"# t* > E PV!!" t*  
An individual’s expected future catch is based on catch history during years active in the 
fishery (i.e. if he chose not to fish one year, this year would not be used in calculating 
expected catch when participating). Individual i’s expected future catch is based on an 
average of catch during participating years. ℎ!! is the actual harvest in time t, and 𝛵! is the set 
of all years where ℎ!! ≠ 0, then expected catch is: 
(1) 𝐸𝐶! = !!!!∈!!!!!  
where 𝑌!! is the number of years individual i participated in the fishery at year t.  
The general quota calculation is a function both harvester i’s participation history and 
that of all other N participants: 
(2) 𝐸𝑄! = ℎ!!!∈!! ℎ!!!∈!!!!!!  
Given an expected quota allocation 𝐸𝑄! , individual i will harvest ℎ! pounds of the total 
allowable catch under an ITQ system. Given a level of total allowable catch in a future year, 𝜏, harvest will be: ℎ!! = 𝐸𝑄! ∙ 𝑇𝐴𝐶! 
The single period gain in harvest over status quo management is11: (3) 𝐺! = 𝐸𝑄! ∙ 𝑇𝐴𝐶 − 𝐸𝐶! 
                                                
11 Note this gain is in terms of fish harvested. In terms of value, if trading is allowed, then Gi is the lower 
bound of this gain. 
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Equation 2 was used to calculate expected quota allocation until policy changed in a way 
that allowed for a harvester to drop low harvest years. In 1991, the council changed the 
initial allocation of halibut quota so that halibut harvesters could drop the two lowest 
performing years and sablefish fishers the single lowest. The harvester’s expected value 
(income) under status quo vs. ITQ management depends on the individual’s expected future 
landings (weight and value). The probability a harvester opposes rationalization is 
increasing in the difference between their private value of expected future landings and 
historic average catch.12  
There are many reasons an individual’s private valuation of future landings may exceed 
actual average catch. Public comments indicate that individuals with higher volatility in 
catch and those not present in the fishery for all qualifying years oppose rationalization. 
These harvesters may optimistically view historic catch by making excuses for low harvest 
years and believing good years more accurately represent skill. It is also anecdotally the case 
that individuals with higher volatility in catch claim to have had a shorter history of 
participation and believe they have yet to reach potential, i.e. learning is possible. This is 
consistent with economic theory. If a high year of catch is used to form the expected future 
catch, whether this belief is rational or not, for instance 𝐸𝐶! = max ℎ!!, then the difference 
between this value and the allocated share will be greater for high volatility harvesters. 
Fishers expected to have high volatility in annual landings include: those with missed 
years, new entrants to the fishery, and those with less dependable skill or negative 
productivity shocks resulting in inconsistent catch from year-to-year. These high volatility 
                                                
12 Even if TAC or price changes under different management regimes, the likelihood of opposition is still 
increasing in this difference. 
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fishers are expected to gain less or lose from ITQs, and hence have increased likelihood of 
opposing ITQs. These arguments lead to three testable predictions: 
Prediction 4a: Vessel owners with greater difference in expected quota allocation and 
actual average landings are more likely to oppose ITQs. 
Prediction 4b: Vessel owners with higher annual variation in landings are more likely to 
oppose ITQs. 
Prediction 4c: Vessel owners with shorter history of participation in the fishery are more 
likely to oppose ITQs.  
New vessel owners can be expected to have higher volatility in landings due to low 
number of years of landings and inexperience. As outlined in prediction 4a and 4b, higher 
volatility results in higher levels of opposition. In fisheries distributing initial quota shares 
by grandfathering, harvesters who spent years not fishing, or just learning about the fishery, 
will rationally expect their future landings to increase. Prediction 4c is supported by 
Grainger and Costello (2014), who show analytically that new entrants are likely to oppose 
ITQs.  
IV. Data and Empirical Design 
Data 
During the period from 1987 to 1992, individuals, companies, NGOs, and many other 
groups publically stated their position on ITQ adoption by written or oral communications. I 
coded these state positions from actual transcripts and written communications, and then 
linked to the vessel registry. The final data set consists of observations from 900 vessel 
owners that own a total of 1,212 vessels. The vessel owners are further broken down into 
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groups by species harvested—5 32 harvest only halibut, 55 harvest only sablefish, and 306 
harvest both species.  
I define an observation as a public comment recorded at a Council meeting or a letter 
addressed to council regarding IFQ implementation. The entire dataset consists of 3,210 
comments made by 2,904 unique individuals via meeting participation or letter writing 
between the years of 1987 and 1992. I code participation records according to stated position 
on ITQs, and records that are ambiguous are dropped from the sample. Of the original 3884 
participation records, 674 are dropped because the stated position on ITQs is uncertain, 
undetermined, or unaddressed by the record. The primary focus of this analysis is on a 
subsample (N=900) of the commenters that owned 1,012 vessels harvesting halibut, 
sablefish or both species during the qualifying period for initial quota allocation (1987-
1990). My analysis utilizes a variety of data sources including NPFMC meeting minutes, 
NPFMC newsletters, and Alaska Federal Vessel Registry as described in Table 1. Column 
one provides the agency or source from which data was obtained. Column two provides a 
description of the types of data obtained from the source, and column three provides details 
on the actual data used in this analysis. The council keeps record of policy decisions, agenda 
items and public comment in “meeting binders” stored in Anchorage, Alaska. I visited the 
NPFMC office in Anchorage, Alaska and made copies of all meeting binder materials to 
build a data set of political participation.  
To the best of my knowledge, the data described above represents the entire population 
of comments for the period 1987 to 1992. Up to 70% of individuals harvesting sablefish and 
30% harvesting halibut between 1987 and 1992 made a public comment (written or oral) 
pertaining to ITQ implementation. An additional 2,310 individuals or companies not owning 
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vessels harvesting halibut or sablefish participated in the political process, either by mail or 
by speaking at a meeting. Although the overall number of sablefish harvesters is smaller, a 
much larger percentage of sablefish harvesters chose to participate in the political process. 
Variables describing support or opposition and harvester characteristics are listed in 
Table 2. A comment is coded to determine demographic characteristics and the stance of the 
commenter on IFQ implementation. For most observations, the individual clearly states 
whether she is in favor of the proposal. For observations in which the individual’s stance is 
not clear, the observation is coded as “uncertain.” Each observation consists of a date, name, 
affiliation, occupation, location, vessel ownership status, and the comment/opinion 
expressed. Observations recorded from letters do not always contain affiliation of the 
individual(s), but consist of date of comment, name, and whether or not the individual is in 
favor of ITQs. A sample data letter is provided in the figures section of this paper (Figure 1). 
 Vessel owners in the state of Alaska are required to register their vessel in a vessel 
database. A unique file number identifies every individual or entity owning a vessel, and 
specific vessels owned are given a unique vessel number. When harvesters land fish in 
Alaska, they are required to fill out fish tickets, providing vessel and catch information 
including vessel number, date, and weight and value landed. To determine whether or not an 
individual owned a vessel, I searched the Alaskan State Vessel Registry for all participants 
by name, address and vessel name provided in the comment or letter. In this way the 
comment database is matched with the vessel registry database. If the individual owns one 
or more boats, all vessel information is recorded. This individual will typically have one 
unique file number with many vessel numbers.  Other information provided by the vessel 
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registry includes vessel name, homeport, mailing address, ADFG (Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game) number, vessel length, gear, year, and ownership information. 
Each vessel is assigned a unique vessel (ADFG) number, which is consistent over time. 
Upon making a landing, the vessel operator is required to fill out a fish ticket form 
containing information on the location, weight, value, date, and species landed. For the years 
the individual owns the vessel, the vessel’s landings data are recorded from ADFG fish 
tickets. In this way, catch is matched to the vessel and then to the public comment. 
An individual’s catch and catch volatility is measured for each species (halibut and 
sablefish) for the four years 1987-1990, which are years for which catch data is available 
and for which actual quota allocation was to be based at the time letters were written.  
Annual standard deviation in catch and coefficient of variation (CV) are used as measures of 
harvester volatility. The coefficient of variation is equal to the standard deviation divided by 
total landings. CV is used in addition to standard deviation to control for increased 
magnitude of standard deviation as landings increase.  
The participant’s address (either return address, stated address, or address from vessel 
registry) is used to classify whether the individual is from a remote location. Remoteness is 
defined by whether or not the individual lives within driving distance of a town with a direct 
flight to Seattle. If the town of residence or homeport does not have direct air access to 
Seattle or is not within driving distance of such access, it is classified as remote  (Ri=1). All 
towns with known location with airport access outside of Alaska are classified as non-
remote (Ri=0). All observations with unknown locations are dropped from the analysis. 
 
Empirical Design 
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The ideal experimental setting would randomly assign vessel ownership and annual 
catch, then individual position on ITQ management would be observed. Because this 
generating process is not observed, this paper does not directly establish causality; treatment 
of annual catch and vessel ownership is not exogenous. A concern in experimental design is 
that position on ITQs is endogenous to the characteristics of the individuals that determine 
catch. This is most concerning for individuals located in close proximity. Including a fixed 
effect for individual city helps to provide a strong argument for external validity.   
The choice of participation is not exogenous to catch characteristics or position on ITQs. 
This paper is interested in actual participant position on ITQs- not the choice of whether or 
not to participate. I do not analyze what determines political participation.  This analysis is 
performed in chapter two. Cost of participation in the political process is very low, and 
individuals with more extreme preferences are assumed to participate in the political 
process. Political participants accounted for 37% of total Alaska species landings value for 
the period of 1984-1991 and 12.75% of all sablefish and halibut harvesting vessels. Political 
opposition during the ITQ policy formation causes delays in implementation and changes to 
policy design. I address the question, amongst political participants, what determines 
opposition? In other words, external validity can only be assumed for individuals electing to 
participate in the political process.  
 The goal of this paper is to addresses whether explanations for opposition are consistent 
with observed behavior. Aspects of the design of the ITQ policy change through the 
formation process including the initial allocation formula, qualifying requirements, and 
selling/leasing rights. The design changes that occur are likely not exogenous of comments 
made previously.  
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An individual will be in favor of ITQs if she expects to be at least as well under the new 
policy setting. The position of party i, Yi, on the implementation of ITQs is equal to one if in 
favor of ITQ implementation and zero if opposed. Yi is regressed on the characteristics of 
party i that are expected to affect his or her position on ITQs using three different regression 
equations. All regressions are run using a linear probability model. A linear probability 
model allows the coefficients of the regressors to be interpreted as percentages and makes 
fewer distributional assumptions.  
Regression equation (1) is performed on the entire sample of commenters and includes a 
dummy variable for vessel ownership, remoteness, and a dummy if the comment occurs 
in1992 or later, 𝐿92!, when ITQ design changed. The dummy variable for vessel ownership, 
VOi, is equal to one if the commenter is linked to a vessel ownership record during the study 
period. Equation (1) is used to test Predictions 1 and 2 by examining the coefficients on 
vessel ownership, VOi and remoteness, Ri:  (1) 𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑅! + 𝛽𝑉𝑂! + 𝛿𝐿92! + 𝑢! , 
The subsample of commenters that own vessels is used to analyze the direct relationship 
between expected monetary benefits under ITQs and stated position on ITQs. All variables 
are specific to an individual or entity, denoted as subscript i. Variables specific to harvesters 
including Log Lbs, CV, SD, and percent participation, are specific to individuals and 
species, denoted as superscript F. Fish species F is equal to either S, sablefish, or H, halibut. 
The anticipated change in distribution of wealth is mainly due to the redistribution of 
catch under ITQ management. The term 𝐷!! is the percent difference between the harvester’s 
“participating average,” the average when only including years fished, and the harvester’s 
actual average when including all years. This term represents the disparity in expected quota 
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allocation and expected future catch under status quo management. Variables CV, SD, and 
Percent Years Participating are included in place of 𝐷!!in some specifications.   
Regressions performed on vessel owners include a dummy variable indicating whether 
or not individual i is a sablefish harvester, Si. This dummy variable Si equals one if the 
individual harvests sablefish and zero otherwise. Regression equations two and three differ 
by whether they include the log of standard deviation in annual landings of individual i for 
species F. (2)  𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑅! + 𝜃𝑆! + (𝜓!𝐷!!)! + 𝑢! (3) 𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑅! + 𝜃𝑆! + 𝜓!𝐷!! + ! 𝛺!𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑏𝑠!!)+ 𝑢! 
 
 
Similar to specifications (1)-(4), prediction 2 is tested by examining the coefficient on 
remoteness, γ, and is expected to be negative—being from a remote location decreases the 
likelihood a vessel owner supports ITQs. 
Prediction 3, that support for ITQs will be increasing in size of operation, is tested by 
including the coefficient on LogLbs, Ω, and is expected to be positive if higher landings 
contribute to increased probability of supporting ITQs. Including the variable LogLbs in the 
regression helps to isolate the effect of volatility on support by controlling for the size of 
operations (e.g. if larger operations inherently have higher standard deviation in annual 
catch). 
Prediction 4a states vessel owners with greater difference in expected quota allocation 
and actual average landings are more likely to oppose ITQs. Prediction 4a is tested by 
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examining the coefficient on 𝐷!! in regression equation (3) which is expected to be negative 
if greater difference in expected quota allocation and actual average landings increases the 
likelihood of opposing ITQs. 
Prediction 4b, vessel owners with higher annual variation in landings are more likely to 
oppose ITQs, is tested by substituting variables CV or SD in place of 𝐷!! . Coefficients on 
CV and SD are expected to be negative if higher variation in annual landings leads to 
increased likelihood of opposition. The CV variable is used in place of SD to control for 
correlation between size of operation and standard deviation in landings. Prediction 4c, 
regarding participation history support for ITQs by harvesters is tested by including the 
coefficient on Percent Years attending, and is expected to be negative if non-participation 
during the qualifying period decreases the likelihood of support. 
V. Results 
The descriptive statistics found in table 3 serve as prelude to results. Average landings 
for both species, measured in log pounds, are higher for individuals in favor of ITQs, which 
is consistent with prediction 2. Consistent with predictions 4a, 4b, and 4c vessel owners in 
favor of ITQs have a lower difference between expected catch and expected quota 
allocation; a lower average CV; and higher percent years participation than opposed vessel 
owners. While the conditional means appear to show vessel owners with standard deviation 
in landings are more likely to be in favor of ITQ, there is high correlation between pounds 
landed and standard deviation. This necessitates a statistical analysis to disentangle effects 
of variation in catch and size of operation. 
Table 4 provides results for empirical specifications performed on the entire sample of 
commenters. Prediction 2 states that remote harvesters are more likely to oppose ITQs. I test 
  30 
this prediction by including a dummy variable for remoteness in all specifications. The first 
four specifications are used for the entire sample to compare vessels owners to the entire 
population of commenters.  In all four specifications vessel owner have a higher likelihood 
of support. In (2) and (3), remoteness is shown to reduce the probability overall that 
commenters are in favor, and (4) includes an interaction of remoteness with vessel 
ownership to test the sensitivity of vessel owners to being located in a remote location 
relative to other stakeholders. The magnitude on the coefficient on remoteness, -.303, can be 
interpreted as the non-vessel owner’s change in base-line probability of ITQ support 
resulting from being located in remote location. The coefficient on vessel ownership, 
coincidently, offsets the effect of being remote entirely. Thus, remote vessel owners have a 
likelihood of opposition just of the interacted term (-.205). This result indicates vessel 
owners are sensitive to being located in a remote location, but that this effect is similar or 
less than that of non-vessel owning commenters. The remote variable is an important 
predictor of an individual’s position on ITQs and is significant at the 1 percent level in all 
regressions in which it is included.  
Table 5 provides results for empirical specifications (5-12) performed on vessel owners 
only. Prediction 3 states that opposition to ITQs will be decreasing in average quantity of 
fish landed. The effect of average landings on probability of supporting ITQs is tested by 
including the log of average pounds landed for each species in (5), (7), (8), (10), and (12). 
The coefficient on log of average pounds is consistently positive for both species and 
significant at the 1 or 5 percent level for sablefish. Increasing the log of average pounds 
landed by 1 percent, increases the probability an individual is in favor of ITQs by ~0.045 
percentage points for sablefish and ~.01 percentage points for halibut.  
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The magnitude of the coefficient is small for small changes in average catch. However, 
given the high variance of average landings for both species, the effect may also be quite 
large. A 1% increase in average sablefish landings at the mean of sablefish harvest translates 
to harvesting an additional 61lbs of sablefish. However, the standard deviation of sablefish 
landings is 122,602lbs, meaning increasing average sablefish landings by one standard 
deviation results in a 90 percentage point increase in probability of supporting ITQs. The 
coefficient on the log of average halibut landings is only significant in (8), which includes 
standard deviation. The magnitude of the coefficient on halibut average landings is smaller 
than that of sablefish, with a maximum value of 0.0184, indicating a one percent increase in 
average halibut pounds harvested increases the probability of being in favor of ITQs by 
0.018 percentage points. 
Predictions 4A, 4B and 4C, relating to the expected change in landings distribution 
under ITQ management, are tested by examining coefficients on percent of years present in 
fishery in specifications (6) and (7), standard deviation of annual landings in (8), coefficient 
of variation (CV) landings in (9) and (10), and the difference in expected catch under quota 
system vs. status quo in (11) and (12). Log of average pounds is predicted to be an important 
determinant of position, prediction 3, but is excluded from (5), (8), and (10) to test the 
coefficients on the variables testing predictions 4A, 4B and 4C, with which it is highly 
correlated. When log of average pounds is combined with volatility variables, the 
explanatory power of the coefficients is weakened but the signs of the coefficients remain 
stable. 
The coefficient on percent of years present in fishery is expected to have a positive effect 
on the probability of being in favor of ITQs, but all other coefficients are expected to be 
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negative. The coefficient on percent years in attendance is used to directly test prediction 4c: 
vessel owners with shorter history of participation in the fishery are more likely to oppose 
ITQs. The sign of the coefficient on total years is consistently positive, but the magnitude is 
quite small for both species. An increase of one percent in the percent of years in attendance 
increases the probability of being in favor of ITQs by around 1 percentage point in 
specification (7). The coefficient on percent years participating is only statistically 
significant for Sablefish in (6) at the 10 percent level. 
The coefficients on CV and SD are used to test prediction 4b: vessel owners with higher 
annual variation in landings are more likely to oppose ITQs. The coefficient on both halibut 
and sablefish SD is insignificant for both specifications used, and the sign on the sablefish 
SD deviates from predictions. These estimates are imprecise because standard deviation is 
highly collinear with total catch. Larger boats tend to be in favor of ITQs, but also have, on 
average, higher standard deviation. The coefficient of variation is used as an alternative 
measure to SD of harvester volatility over time. The CV, provides a control for the high 
degree of correlation between average landings and standard deviation. Unlike the 
coefficient on SD, the coefficient on CV is consistently negative for both species in all 
specifications, and is significant at the 5% level for sablefish in (9). 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the role of distributional concerns in determining a harvester’s 
preference for the Alaskan sablefish and halibut ITQ program. It provides strong evidence 
that the allocation of quota share helps explain the stated preference, for or against, of a 
stakeholder or vessel owner. Using a unique data set of individual comments on ITQ 
adoption, catch history and vessel ownership, I find political support for ITQs to be higher 
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amongst vessel owners, agents located in non-remote locations, high volume fishers and low 
volatility fishers.  These results are consistent with theoretical predictions and are the first 
empirical results on the factors that lead to opposition to rights based management in 
fisheries. 
The Alaskan halibut and sablefish ITQ program, as initially proposed, did not account 
for individual production shocks or inconsistent fishing in determining initial quota 
allocation. The original program was never implemented. After five years of public debate, 
the final version of the ITQ policy was designed in such a way that increased the distribution 
to small fishermen, new participants, and fishermen incurring negative productivity shocks. 
This was accomplished by dropping the lowest performing years when calculating quota 
shares. Ultimately, the initial grandfathering of quota for sablefish was calculated using the 
best five of six harvest years for 1985 through 1990, and the best five out of seven years, 
1984 through 1990, for halibut (NPFMC, 1997).  
The adoption of property rights hinges on the acceptance of resource users and other 
stakeholders. These parties receive benefits under status quo management, and can oppose 
changes using the political process. The intended permanence of the rights and the fact that 
trading of rights can provide windfall gains provides stakeholders with incentive to jockey 
for position in the initial allocation process. This paper provides insight into the political 
economy of transitioning out of inefficient resource management and its findings echo 
Hanneson (2004): “those who expect to gain, will promote and support the new institution, 
those who expect to lose will fight it with equal or greater vigor.”  
Much of the existing economic literature focuses on policies that achieve economic 
efficiency and sustainability goals. However, the role of distribution in the implementation 
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of new policy is less frequently addressed. To achieve political feasibility, trade-offs 
between addressing distributional concerns and economic efficiency are often required. The 
tradable aspect of individual quotas allows the resource to be continuously reallocated to its 
highest valued uses, but rights are rarely fully tradable in fishery property rights programs. 
Like many cap-and-trade and property rights based management programs, fishing rights 
deviate from traditional economic models by including provisions to limit distributional 
impacts. Two major policy design aspects altered to address political concerns in the 
formation of the halibut and sablefish ITQs are ownership restrictions (concentration caps) 
and changes to the initial quota allocation formula. Support for the ITQ program 
significantly increased with the grandfathering allocation formula changed to be more 
flexible.  
When distributional concerns generate political opposition, policy makers may look to 
reformulating the way quota is initially allocated to achieve political feasibility. The initial 
allocation of rights should be independent of achieving economic efficiency (Coase, 1960).  
Providing “forgiving years” can help achieve political feasibility without sacrificing the cost 
savings provided by fully transferable aspect of quotas. Utilizing grandfathering rules as a 
method of addressing distributional issues under the new property rights regime may allow 
policymakers to design politically feasible management systems without sacrificing 
efficiency. 
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VIII. Table and Figures 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1: Data Sources (Years 1987-1992) 
Source Description Details Managing Agency 
NPFMC 
Meeting 
Minutes 
Minutes of council meetings 
covering agenda items (proposed 
changes to management).  
Name, location, agency, 
comment, date  NPFMC 
NPFMC 
Newsletters 
Quarterly newsletter to inform 
public of changes to FMPS and 
agenda items for upcoming 
meetings. Includes upcoming 
events, forums, and fishery 
news.  
Proposed/Implemented changes 
to FMP NPFMC 
ADFG Fish 
Tickets 
Log of all landings made in the 
state of Alaska.  
ADFG number, species landed, 
weight, value, port, year and 
month of landings 
ADFG 
Alaska State 
Vessel Registry 
 Listings of vessels licensed by 
the state of Alaska to participate 
in commercial fishing activities. 
ADFG number, ownership 
information (name, address, 
phone), vessel characteristics, 
years of ownership, home-port 
CFEC 
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Table 2: Variables Description 
Variable Description Calculation Source 
Sablefish 
Dummy variable for whether 
or not entity harvests sablefish 
between 1987 and 1990. 
Sablefish=1 if total 
weight landed between 
1987 and 1990>0; =0 
otherwise 
CFEC Fish Ticket 
Data; AK Vessel 
Registry 
Remote 
Dummy variable for whether 
or not entity’s mailing address 
is located in a remote 
community. 
Remote=1 if city of 
residence is classified as 
remote (1); =0 otherwise 
Based on criteria 
described in text 
CV 
Variable measuring 
coefficient of variation in 
catch for each species at date 
of comment. 
 =SD Annual Landings/ 
Average Landed Weight 
CFEC Fish Ticket 
Data 
Log Lbs. 
Measure of the log of the 
average landed weight by 
species at date of comment. 
 = LOG(Average Lbs.) CFEC Fish Ticket Data 
SD 
Measure of the standard 
deviation in annual landings 
for each species at date of 
comment. 
 = Standard Deviation in 
Annual Landings 
CFEC Fish Ticket 
Data 
Percent Years 
Participating 
Measure of the percent of 
years present in each fishery 
(harvest>0) at the date of 
comment. 
 =Participating 
years/Total Years 
CFEC Fish Ticket 
Data; AK Vessel 
Registry 
D 
Measure of the difference 
between  “participating 
average,” the average when 
only including years fished, 
and the harvester’s actual 
average when including all 
years 
 =(Participating 
Average-Actual 
Average)/Participating 
Average 
CFEC Fish Ticket 
Data; AK Vessel 
Registry 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
	 	 	    Sablefish Halibut 
Variable   Opposed In favor Opposed In favor 
Log Average Pounds 9.48 11.18 9.24 10.18 
Standard Deviation (SD) 56,094.32 127,334.70 16,972.31 25,967.58 
Coefficient of Variation 
(CV) 2.11 1.78 1.85 1.55 
Percent Difference 
Quota 69.61% 61.09% 61.26% 51.91% 
Percent Years 
Participating 30.51% 39.11% 39.05% 48.78% 
Remote   76.47% 32.18% 85.29% 34.26% 
 
 
Table 4: All-Population Regressions 
		 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable  Position (1=support)   
Remote 	 -0.362*** -0.364*** -0.303*** 
	 	 -0.0711 -0.0702 -0.0654 
Vessel Owner 0.156** 0.154* 0.157** 0.303*** 
	 -0.0783 -0.0803 -0.0794 -0.0646 
Remote x Vessel Owner 	 	 -0.205** 
	 	 	 	 -0.095 
Letter Year>1991 	 	 0.0455* 0.0417 
	 	 	 -0.0274 -0.0273 
Constant 0.113 0.373*** 0.360*** 0.318*** 
	 -0.069 -0.0625 -0.0603 -0.0602 
	 	 	 	 	
Observations 3,071 3,071 3,071 3,071 
R-squared 0.038 0.236 0.239 0.252 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Vessel Owner Regressions 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Position (1=support) 
Log Lbs: Sablefish 
0.0462*** 	 0.0451** 0.0502*** 
-0.0173 	 -0.0179 -0.0175 
Log Lbs: Halibut 
0.00971 	 0.00673 0.0165*** 
-0.00846 	 -0.00868 -0.00595 
% Years Present: 
Sablefish 
	 0.260* 0.0441 	
	 -0.137 -0.124 	
% Years Present: 
Halibut 
	 0.0358 0.0619 	
	 -0.0455 -0.0505 	
SD: Sablefish 
	 	 	 1.39E-08 
	 	 	 -7.06E-08 
SD: Halibut 
	 	 	 -1.41E-06 
	 	 	 -8.75E-07 
Remote 
-0.397*** -0.430*** -0.398*** -0.393*** 
-0.112 -0.106 -0.111 -0.106 
Sablefish 
-0.211* 0.161* -0.221* -0.231* 
-0.123 -0.0882 -0.125 -0.132 
Letter Year>1991 
0.102*** 0.0968** 0.0999*** 0.0945** 
-0.0349 -0.0373 -0.0362 -0.0363 
Constant 
0.335** 0.436*** 0.341** 0.291*** 
-0.135 -0.0829 -0.135 -0.11 
	 	 	 	 	
Observations 900 900 900 900 
R-squared 0.381 0.359 0.383 0.384 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Vessel Owner Regressions 
	 	  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables   
Log Lbs: 
Sablefish 
	 0.0407** 	 0.0438** 
	 -0.0182 	 -0.0175 
Log Lbs: 
Halibut 
	 0.0112 	 0.0113 
	 -0.0107 	 -0.0106 
CV: Sablefish 
-0.122** -0.0455 	 	
-0.049 -0.0553 	 	
CV: Halibut 
-0.00984 -0.0283 	 	
-0.0157 -0.0231 	 	
% Difference 
Quota: 
Sablefish  
	 	 -0.297** -0.0504 
	 	 -0.134 -0.141 
% Difference 
Quota: Halibut 
	 	 -0.00307 -0.0677 
	 	 -0.0399 -0.0591 
Remote 
-0.420*** -0.396*** -0.427*** -0.399*** 
-0.105 -0.11 -0.107 -0.111 
Sablefish 
0.489*** -0.0838 0.449*** -0.17 
-0.132 -0.211 -0.141 -0.177 
Letter 
Year>1991 
0.0970** 0.103*** 0.0979*** 0.103*** 
-0.0374 -0.037 -0.0369 -0.0362 
Constant 
0.459*** 0.375*** 0.448*** 0.366*** 
-0.0883 -0.126 -0.0901 -0.129 
	 	 	 	 	
Observations 900 900 900 900 
R-squared 0.364 0.385 0.359 0.383 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Example Letter 
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The Decision to Participate: The Role of Influence and Cost in Stakeholder Participation in 
the Formation of the Public Policy 
The Case of the Alaskan Sablefish and Halibut ITQs 
Sara A. Sutherland  
Bren School of Environmental Science and Management 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
 
Paulina Oliva 
Department of Economics 
University of California, Irvine 
 
Public policy is often made after the opinions of interested parties are solicited. Often, an 
individual, firm, or other organization can participate in the political process through voting, 
contributing to campaigns, lobbying, attending public meetings, or letter-writing. The timing 
and ultimate outcome of policymaking is shaped by this participation, but there is limited 
empirical evidence that examines how cost and expected gain from participation affect the 
decision to participate. We analyze political participation in the formation of the Alaskan 
halibut and sablefish individual fishing quotas. The data set provides income and 
demographic details of political participants and non-participants. The process in which 
fisheries policy is implemented allows for individuals to participate at different cost levels 
ranging from nearly zero to thousands of dollars. We provide a broad literature review of 
political participation and describe the process of participating in United States fisheries 
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management. We then examine current theories of political participation in the context on 
the case at hand. 
 
I. Introduction 
The difficulties of transitioning out of an inefficient management regime are linked 
to the cost of the process by which a new institution is created and adopted (Libecap 1989; 
1993). Political resistance to new institutions can result in delays or even stop the policy 
formation and adoption process. In the transition from one resource management regime to 
another, some users may see net costs even if the overall gains are large. Understanding the 
motivations for participation helps in the formulation of a positive theory of the policy 
formation process and its outcomes. The decision of a stakeholder to voice his or her 
position on a policy issue has been addressed most thoroughly in voter turnout literature. 
However, the ability to understand the determinants of participation when it is limited to a 
single act per issue is limited. Of importance to this paper, empirical analysis of voting 
typically fails to allow the researcher to differentiate between expected utility changes and 
the cost as determinants of participation.  
This paper examines the determinants of political participation in the context of 
fisheries regulatory reform where stakeholders can choose to participate in several modes 
and potentially influence outcomes. We provide a unique contribution to the political 
participation literature by using individual level data to compare characteristics of agents 
participating in the political process at different cost levels. This is accomplished by using a 
sample in which stakeholders may participate for free, not participate, or physically 
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participate in the political process by attending a meeting. Stakeholders that do not attend 
meetings may chose not to attend because of the high cost of travel and time, a low 
perception in their probability of influencing the outcome, or a small difference in expected 
utility under different policy outcomes. Data on participation in five different rounds of 
public discussion around the establishment of Alaska’s halibut and sablefish individual 
transferable quota (ITQ) program is combined with detailed characteristics and performance 
of participant and non-participant stakeholders to study the determinants and mechanisms of 
participation in the political process. The rich data on allows us to construct variables that 
are directly linked to the expected benefits of the ITQ regime such as the difference in 
expected catch under the two regimes. Other variables, such as distance from the public 
hearing location, can be used as a source of variation in cost for some, but not all, modes of 
participation. 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to survey the general literature on 
political participation in order to identify the main hypotheses in the literature that explain 
participation in political process, and to summarize the available empirical evidence. 
Second, to conduct basic analysis of the data on Alaska’s fisheries that can provide a broad 
picture of the likely determinants of participation behavior. The paper is structured as 
follows: Section I provides a review of relevant political participation literature. Section II 
provides the institutional specifics of fisheries management in the United States and 
describes the policy implementation process of the IFQ. Section III describes the 
participation data in the halibut and sablefish ITQ programs, and IV conducts basic data 
analysis to understand participation by taking advantage of the rich detail and variation in 
the Alaska fisheries data. A discussion follows. 
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I. Background 
This section reviews literature relevant to political participation, specifically in the 
context of voting, as well as less conventional modes of participation such as petition 
signing. The decision to participate in the political process, particularly the electoral process, 
has been studied extensively by political economists. Most of the political participation 
literature focuses on voter turn-out. The key conclusions from this literature are 
summarized, and the extent to which they can be applied to less common forms of political 
participation such as writing a letter, signing a petition or attending a meeting is discussed. 
Participation Models 
In the political science literature, political participation is categorized as either 
conventional (formal) or non-conventional (nontraditional) (Milbrath, 1965; McFarland and 
Thomas, 1996; Goldstone, 2003; Heaney and Rohas, 2006). Some examples of formal 
participation include electoral participation, lobbying, attending a meeting, and contacting 
elected representatives. Non-conventional forms of participation such as protests, 
demonstrations, or petitions have become increasingly popular relative to electoral 
participation, and discussions of these forms of participation have increased in the literature 
(Dalton, 2008; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Norris et al., 2005; Finkel and Opp, 1991; 
Putnam, 2000; Schussman and Soule, 2005)13. Generally, political participation is modeled 
as being undertaken when an individual or group has preferences about policy outcomes or 
candidates. The voter turnout literature analyzes the effect of individual traits and social 
characteristics that influence political participation. Individual characteristics influencing 
participation include: cost of participation, access to information, socioeconomic status, 
                                                
13 See figure 2 in appendix (from Dalton, 2008). Trends in American Political Participation. 
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civic knowledge and political efficacy. Social factors also affect the decision to participate, 
with voter turnout found to increase significantly with group identity (Schram and 
Sonnemans, 1996). 
Some of this work has an economic underpinning. The seminal work by Downs 
(1957) summarizes a rational agent as a person with transitive preferences who always 
chooses the highest rated of his preferences and makes consistent decisions through time. 
The rational choice model was one of the earliest models of political participation, and 
asserts thatrational individuals participate in political activity when the benefits of such 
activity outweigh the costs (Aldrich, 1993; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). One of the 
predominant views on the decision to participate assumes people engage in a strategic cost 
benefit calculation of participation. Participation occurs when the probability an individual 
influences the outcome π multiplied by the expected benefits, B, exceeds the costs of 
participation, C. Participation Y is a binary variable equal to one if an individual 
participates. That is: 
𝑌 = 1          𝑖𝑓    𝜋𝐵 − 𝐶 ≥ 00                     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
The benefits variable B, is defined as an individual’s expected benefits if the ideal 
policy or politician is selected. In the context of national elections, the probability any 
individual’s vote is pivotal is near zero, making the act of voting a paradox at even 
extremely small costs of participation (Olsen, 1965). To account for participation at very 
low probabilities, traditional models have been modified to include the consumption benefit 
of voting, V (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). 
𝑌 = 1          𝑖𝑓    𝜋𝐵 − 𝐶 + 𝑉 ≥ 00                              𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
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An individual’s sense of civic duty, social pressure, and warm glow may contribute 
to benefits exogenous to the outcome, V. Voter turnout is decreasing in the cost of voting 
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Powell, 1986; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). Some 
examples include: distance to the polling place, weather, registration requirements, and time 
required to think about the voting decision (Feddersen, 2004). The costs of participating by 
attending a public meeting or hearing is analogous to those of voting; participants spend 
time gathering information, preparing submissions, and travelling to hearings (Osborne et al, 
1999). In the 1988 presidential election, one inch of rain was estimated to reduce turnout by 
about 8% (Shachar and Nebluff, 1999). 
A variation of the rational choice model, the group rule-utilitarian model, assumes 
elections naturally split potential voters in to one of two groups: supporters or opposers 
(Coate, Conlin, and Moro, 2007). Members of each group chose a voting rule that, if 
followed by everyone else in the group, would maximize their side's aggregate utility. Each 
group creates a participation rule that specifies the critical cost level below which a group 
member should participate.  These “equilibrium voting rules” depend on the relative sizes of 
the two groups, election-specific characteristics and expected cost of voting. In the context 
of smaller, local meetings, these group voting rules imply participation, which is coupled 
with coordination with other voters, may be more influential.  
Political economists most commonly use resource models14, where political 
participation is dependent on individual resources such as money, time, and civic skills. The 
                                                
14Resource models are referred to as the Civic Voluntarism models and SES models.  
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first resource models of political participation specified two prime resources in determining 
political participation: money and time. Time is a resource that an individual can contribute 
to the political process by working in a campaign, writing a letter to a public official, 
attending a community meeting (Brady et al., 1995), or gathering information. Matsusaka 
(1995) argues that the probability of turning out increases with the individual’s information 
level. This model is a departure from the rational-choice models, suggesting the probability 
of participation in the political process is a preference based on individual characteristics, 
rather than their stake in the outcome. 
Similarly, the socioeconomic status (SES) model of political participation asserts 
individuals with higher education, higher income, and higher status jobs are more active in 
politics. According to Pattie et al. (2004), individuals with the greatest access to resources, 
the rich and well-educated, dominate political engagement. Tying this to rational choice 
models, SES may influence participation through enhancing the efficacy of any action. 
Game theoretic models of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1999) suggest higher income 
individuals with higher education have access to higher quality information about political 
issues, and should therefore vote in greater number. Larcinese (1999) argues that wealthier 
individuals have a greater incentive to be more informed, since the benefit of policy-relevant 
information increases with income. Uncertainty increases an individual’s expected regret 
from political participation by increasing the probability she selects the “wrong” candidate. 
Degan and Merlo (2004) suggest this implies a positive relation between information and 
turnout. The positive effect of education on participation has been demonstrated empirically, 
for both traditional and non-traditional forms of participation (Marien, 2010).   
A third theory of political participation, the mobilization model, states individual 
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level participation is determined by political opportunities in the voter’s environment and 
outside social pressures. The mobilization model is linked to the resource model through 
political opportunities. Individuals with greater resources are more likely to have access to 
institutions facilitating political involvement. These sorts of institutions are less commonly 
found in communities where low-SES individuals live (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995: 
337–43). Support for the mobilization model has been established by examining turnout in 
elections as a function of campaigning. While these models attribute participation are not 
entirely based on economic logic, they do provide an explanation for why people act, and 
especially to vote, when a purely rational model suggests they would not. 
Influence 
A key aspect of many models of participation is the degree to which an individual 
believes their participation will be influential. Even if participation is costless, an agent 
believing participation is worthless will likely abstain. Low levels of political efficacy are 
associated with a failure to participate (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Whiteley 1995).  If the agent’s participation results in a change 
in value of the outcome greater than the cost of participation, the agent will participate. 
Because these models are typically about voting, the level of influence is related to the 
number of participants, with influence decreasing with population. Bias (2000) finds 
electoral participation to be decreasing in the size of the voting base and increasing in the 
election’s closeness. Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner (1999) study participation in a 
collective decision-making process and find participation falls with population size. 
Discussion of what makes participation more or less influential for other types of 
participation is more closely associated with literature on lobbying and influence in politics. 
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Influence may also explain the act of not participating. In 1975, Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady suggested that one helpful way to understand participation is to ask why people 
do not participate politically. The authors provide three explanations for abstention: 
“because they can’t; because they don’t want to; or because nobody asked. In other words 
people may be inactive because they lack resources, because they lack psychological 
engagement with politics, or because they are outside of the recruitment networks that bring 
people into politics. (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995: 269)” 
Earlier papers by economists Osborne, Rosenthal and Turner (2000) and Feddersen 
(1992) view an outcome or policy as a point in space. In such spatial models, an agent’s 
utility is maximized at a single consumption bundle and utility is decreasing as the policy 
moves further away in the policy space. Like other models of participation, an individual’s 
decision to participate depends on her perceived level of influence over policy outcomes and 
the cost of participation. Both Feddersen (1992) and Osborne et al. (2000) predict 
participation to be lower for agents whose ideal policy outcome is close to the anticipated 
outcome (Osborne et al., 2000). Osborne 1999 et al. find participation decreases as 
preferences over the policy space become more moderate. In a situation when voting is 
costless, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) find agents with no strong preference for one 
outcome versus the other abstain.  Empirical findings indicate firms with preferences for 
extreme policies are more likely to participate in public meetings determining regulation 
(Bulkley et al., 2001; Turner and Weninger, 2001).  
Self-Interest 
There is strong empirical analysis that political participation is a function of policy 
consequences at the individual level. Evidence of self-interest motivated participation has 
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been found in many political settings: social security reform, student loans, school board 
elections, and affordable housing reform. Individual level analysis reveals that political 
participation is higher when the stakes are higher. In a study of political participation by 
seniors in social security policy formation, participation was highest for seniors that were 
more dependent on social security benefits and less common among higher-income seniors 
(Campbell, 2002). This result was especially pronounced for letter writing about the 
program. Ozymy (2012) analyzes student borrower’s participation in political activities 
related to student loans (voting, contributing, and contacting officials), and finds the 
probability of participating increases as their income decreases. 
Empirical findings suggest that participation in program and policy formation is also 
motivated by self-interest. Shavit, Lahav, and Shahrabani (2014) examine the role of self-
interest in the decision to take an active part in the context of political protests. In 2011, 
hundreds of thousands of Israelis protested the rising in the cost of living. The authors 
distributed questionnaires to MBA students asking whether the person engaged in protest 
activity and other details influencing participation. One of the major findings is that more 
active participants tend to rent homes. The authors suggest a renter’s incentive to protest is 
high because they expect their action would influence government to take actions to make 
housing more affordable for people like them. These empirical studies suggest rational 
choice models can provide important insight into participation, but that SES models also 
provide important additional insight. Hastings et al. (2007) examine the effect of school 
lottery outcomes on voting behavior in a school board election. Overall, losing the lottery 
was found to have no significant impact on voting behavior in a school board election. 
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When restricting the sample to likely voters15, lottery losers with above median income and 
prior voting history were significantly more likely to vote than lottery winners.  
Empirical analysis of political participation at the election level is abundant, but 
analysis of participation through less conventional channels such as public meetings is 
limited.  In the context of fishery council meetings, Turner and Weninger (2005) find that 
participation in council meetings is higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. Lise 
(2000) uses household survey data to examine determinants of voluntary participation in 
India’s forest management. Household participation in forest management is found to be 
increasing in their dependence on forest goods such as fuelwood and timber. Social and 
economic factors are also important determinants of participation. In a similar case study in 
Haiti (Dolisca et al., 2006), high forest dependency stimulates participation in forest 
management. In the context of public meetings determining waste management decisions, 
McComas (2001) finds that meeting attendees tend to report higher incomes and have at 
least one child living at home, and in one of the two communities studied, individuals that 
previously attended meetings tended to perceive greater risks from the waste site. All of 
these studies suggest individual self-interest plays a large role in the decision to politically 
participate. The literature is tied to the case of fishery management in the following section, 
but first background on the context of the case is provided. 
 
II. Institutional Setting 
I now describe the policy setting in which United States fisheries policy is 
implemented, and how individuals participate. The policy formation of ITQs in the Alaska 
                                                
15 White or high-income families 
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halibut and sablefish fisheries was an iterative process influenced by political participation. 
The policy design changed a number of times through the seven years of deliberations. 
Changes in policy-changed fishers expected benefits under the new regime, and 
consequently incentives for political participation. We are able to construct measure of 
changes in individual level-benefits during different stages of the ITQ policy formation. 
Based on findings of previous political participation literature, political participation in 
fisheries management is expected to depend on self-interest, influence, and cost of 
participation. The size of the constituency for fisheries policy is smaller than that of the US 
electorate, so the literature on influence would suggest that perceived influence is higher in 
this context. Literature on self-interest and participation would suggest individuals standing 
to gain or lose the most under the new ITQ policy would have higher incentive to 
participate.  The constituency of the policy makers of Alaskan fisheries is relatively small, 
but the geographic distribution is large. Vessel owners fishing in Alaskan waters have a 
large degree of variation in distance to meeting, and hence cost of attending a meeting. We 
exploit variation in distance to examine the role of costs in attending fishery council 
meetings. 
The North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) 
 
In United States, fishery management decisions are made by regional councils 
operating under the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA, 1976). The MSA (1976) 
extended US control to waters up to 200 miles off the coast, known as the EEZ and 
established measures to prevent overfishing. The North Pacific Fishery Management 
Council (NPFMC) governs waters off the coast of Alaska. The regional fishery management 
council prepares, implements and amends fishery management regulations and plans for 
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fisheries occurring inside of the EEZ. When reviewing potential rule changes, the Council 
draws upon public input and the services of advisory bodies consisting of experts from state 
and federal agencies, universities, and the public, who serve on panels and committees. The 
NPFMC consists of eleven voting members—all political appointees. Seven council 
members are private citizens from Alaska and Washington and are appointed by the 
Secretary of Commerce based on recommendations of the governors of the states. The 
private citizen council members are familiar with marine biology, the fishing industry, 
and/or marine conservation. The council also includes four non-voting members 
representing the Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, the U.S. Department of State, and the Coast Guard. The council composition is 
designed so that all stakeholders are represented. Council meetings are open to public 
comments—written, emailed and oral.  
All council decisions are made by recorded vote in a public forum after public input. 
Council decisions are then subject to further public input when reviewed by the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).  The final decision is sent for a second review to the 
Secretary of Commerce, who receives further public comment, and final decisions are made. 
If a stakeholder opposes a proposed change in management or “amendment” to a fishery 
management plan, these concerns can be expressed in the public forums of council meetings 
or NMFS meetings. Public input and distributional concerns are taken into account in all 
stages of policy formation and review. Members of the fishing industry and the general 
public may participate in the policy formation in a variety of ways including testifying at 
council meetings or letter writing. The extent to which stakeholder participation influences 
  57 
management design and implementation depends on their political clout, which is related to 
financial resources, political connections, and ability to mobilize public support. 
All council decisions are subject to intense regulatory review and must conform to a 
variety of regulatory acts and laws16. The timeline for regulatory change can take over a 
year, with duration increasing if the regulation is complex or contentious. In the context of 
US fisheries, decisions about resource management are mandated by the Administrative 
Procedure Act to incorporate stakeholder input (Turner et al, 2005).17 It is apparent that 
political opposition has halted or delayed many resource management programs in the 
United States. When Congress reauthorized the primary law governing fisheries 
management in US federal waters, the Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA, 1976) in 1996, 
political pressure from the processing industry and other equity concerns led to the issuance 
of a 6-year moratorium on the creation of new ITQ programs (Guide to U.S. Environmental 
Policy). Prior to the MSA reauthorization, Alaskan Pollock harvesters attempted to 
strengthen the institutions governing the fishery, but political protests from processors halted 
any new or pending plans to change management regimes in a way that allocated rights to 
individual harvesters. 
                                                
16 Magnuson-Stevens Act, Endangered Species Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act, Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, executive orders and other applicable law 
17The Administrative Procedure Act requires that all U.S. federal regulatory agencies “shall give 
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or 
arguments with or without the opportunity for oral presentation” (Title 5 U.S. Code Section 553(c), 1988 
edition). In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental Protection Agency (1991) the Supreme Court showed its 
willingness to require that public opinion be adequately consulted. (In this case, the court vacated proposed 
regulation because the Environmental Protection Agency prematurely ended public hearings and deprived the 
public of sufficient opportunity to “comment [on], analyse, and influence the [regulatory] proceedings” 
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Development of the Halibut and Sablefish ITQ program 
In 1987, the NPFMC publically announced its decision to consider ITQs as a policy 
action to solve the problems associated with the derby fishing of both sablefish and halibut. 
Due to disputes over allocation, concerns for small fishing communities, and other program 
characteristics, the ITQ program was not officially adopted until 1995. Political participation 
played a major role in the time-line and shape of the final ITQ program. A timeline of major 
events in the development of the ITQ program was constructed using NPFMC newsletters is 
shown in Table 1.18 
Individuals have a variety of avenues to participate in fisheries policy formation. The 
types of participation vary in cost, and potential benefits. We classify observations in to one 
of three levels of participation. The least costly form of participation is signing a petition, 
which takes very little effort and cost is assumed to be negligible. The second level of 
participation is contacting a legislature. An individual may contact a policy maker by 
writing a letter, sending a telegram, or phoning in. Participation by contacting a policy 
maker requires more effort and potentially more resources than signing a petition. The third 
and most intense mode of participation is speaking at a fishery council meeting. Council 
meetings are only held 4-5 times per year and travel is costly in terms of money and time, 
especially given the limited transportation infrastructure within the state of Alaska. 
Participation levels in the ITQ policy formation varied over the formation process. 
Different levels of participation are expected to be a result of changes in individual expected 
benefits through the different changes in policy design. The increasing probability of ITQ 
                                                
18 The NPFMC releases five newsletters annually after council meetings. 
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implementation also likely increased participation over time. This is in line with previous 
literature finding the closeness of elections increases voter turnout. Participation is also 
expected to be decreasing in cost and increasing in influence. The extent to which an 
individual will benefit by participating in the political process of reform depends on the cost 
of participation, the individual’s perceived influence over the political process, and the 
difference in welfare under the two different management regimes. 
Self-interest 
The bargaining position taken by individuals is determined by their expected welfare 
under new management vs. status quo. The most obvious determinant of change in welfare 
under ITQs is an individual’s participation history in the fishery. The initial quota allocation 
determines the distribution of wealth and decision making power over the resource. Quota is 
typically allocated via grandfathering, which allocates harvesters a percentage of the total 
allowable catch based on historic average catch for a given time period. Every time the 
policy design changes in a way that changes an individual’s expected benefits under new 
management, incentives to participate will change. Incentives to participate in the policy 
formation process change as the policy changes. We construct variables to measure 
individual’s expected change in benefits at different stages of the policy formation process. 
Influence 
Participation also depends on the extent to which an individual believes her 
participation will influence the policy outcome. There is evidence that larger firms are more 
influential, and therefore receive greater benefits than smaller firms by attending a meeting. 
Attending a meeting is also the most visible form of participation, and is expected to be the 
most influential in political decision making.  
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Cost 
Vessel owners participate in the policy formation process by written communication 
or attending a meeting. The cost of attending a meeting varies by vessel owner, and depends 
on cost of transportation and time. In general, the further a vessel owner’s city of residence 
is from the meeting location19, the greater the cost of travel to the meeting. An individual 
will attend a meeting if expected benefits of attending outweigh the costs. As distance from 
the meeting increases, so does time and travel cost of attending. Signing a petition is the 
least costly form of participation. Both letter writing and signing a petition are expected to 
be more popular modes of participation than attending a meeting. 
III. Data 
Data used in this paper is derived from three sources: public communications 
regarding Alaska fisheries ITQs; Alaskan State Vessel Registry; and Alaska Fish tickets. 
Public communications are either written testimony or oral testimony. Written testimony 
refers to letters, petitions, form letters, or resolutions addressed to either the NPFMC or 
other governmental officials regarding fishery ITQs. During the period from 1987 to 1991, 
individuals, companies, NGOs, and many other groups publically stated their position on 
ITQ adoption by written or oral communications. Oral public comments are made at council 
meetings or “scoping meetings” in which fishery ITQs are discussed. For the study period, 
public meetings are held four to five times annually. All public communications are coded to 
record the name, address, occupation, company or organization of the agent participating. 
                                                
19 Council meetings are typically held in Anchorage, Alaska. 
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The stance of the participant on ITQ reform is also recorded. A sample data letter is 
provided in the figures section of this paper (Figure 1). 
The stated positions have been coded from actual transcripts and written 
communications, and then linked to the Alaskan Vessel Registry. If the individual is 
determined to own a vessel, the unique vessel number (ADFG number) is recorded. Vessel 
owners in the state of Alaska are required to register their vessel in a vessel database. A 
unique file number identifies every individual or entity owning a vessel, and specific vessels 
owned are given a unique vessel number. When harvesters land fish in Alaska, they are 
required to fill out fish tickets, providing vessel and catch information including vessel 
number, date, weight and value of landings. Linking individual participation to the vessel 
registry and fishery participation data enables us to track the harvest, revenue and city of 
residence of all vessel owners that participate in the political process versus those that do 
not. 
The political participation database consists of participation records from years 
1982-1995. I restrict my discussion to vessel owners during the ITQ formation process 
(1987-1991). The data set consists of 835 unique vessel owner observations that own a total 
of 1,155 vessels between participating in the sablefish or halibut fisheries. An observation is 
defined as a vessel owner’s political participation status each round. The entire dataset of 
participants consists of 3,872 comments made by 2,903 unique individuals via meeting 
participation or letter writing between the years of 1987 and 1991. Participation records are 
coded according to stated position on ITQs. Most comments are very explicit in their policy 
preference, and are coded as either in favor or opposed. Observations are coded as uncertain, 
U, if the comment is an inquiry in to ITQ design or if the comment is making suggestions. If 
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the observation does not pertain to ITQ policy (but perhaps relates to the species), it is coded 
as “N.”  
Table 2 provides data sources utilized in this analysis. Column one provides the 
agency or source from which the data was obtained. Column two provides a description of 
the types of data obtained from the source, and column three provides details on the actual 
data used in this analysis. All public comments were obtained from NPFMC meeting 
minutes, meeting binders, or meeting transcripts. The public comments were gathered 
through correspondence with council staff or by visiting the NPFMC office in Anchorage 
and making copies of all meeting materials. To the best of my knowledge, the data described 
above represents the entire population of public participants for the period 1987 to 1992. 
There are a total of 8,646 unique vessel owners harvesting halibut or sablefish any year 
during the study period. Of these vessel owners, 835 participated in the policy formation 
process a total of 1130 times. 
Variable Construction 
Between 1987 and 1992, the ITQ program design made large changes in the way 
quota was to be initially allocated. Major changes in the initial quota allocation formula, 
qualifying criteria, and planned implementation date are provided in table 3. Sablefish and 
halibut ITQ plans change slightly through any given year, but there are essentially five 
different ITQ design plans that are seriously examined during the sample time period (1987-
1991).  The initial quota allocation scheme was changed on an annual basis. As the ITQ 
policy evolved, the qualifying period for quota allocation (years from which your quota is 
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calculated) became more inclusive.  The qualifying period for quota allocation was updated 
on a yearly basis to account for new entry and more recent participation. 
For vessel owner harvesting halibut or sablefish during the period 1987-1991, 
expected quota allocation (EQ) is calculated for each period according to the allocation 
formula as described in table 4. Each vessel owner’s expected future catch (EC) is calculated 
as an average using only participating years (no zero catch years). The difference in these 
two numbers represents change in wealth under ITQ management (Diff). Harvesters will 
update their expected future catch based on catch information from the most recent year’s 
harvest. A harvester’s expected quota allocation changes based on changes in the allocation 
formula, qualifying years and participation requirements.  
The distance from the vessel owner’s city of residence to meeting location, D, is also 
recorded for each round. The cost of attending a meeting is assumed to be proportional to 
the distance from the vessel owner’s city of residence to the meeting location. The cost of 
participation is measured in terms of distance to Anchorage. The distance of a vessel 
owner’s city of residence to the meeting location (Anchorage, Alaska), is found using 
Google maps distance calculator.  
Given the change in expected difference in expected earnings under status quo 
versus ITQ and cost of participation, the harvester will form preferences for the policy and 
will choose to abstain or participate in the formation of policy. If the individual participates, 
Y is equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. 
IV. Analysis of Participation Data 
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Although only 10.1% of vessel owners participated in the political process of 
developing the ITQ program, these participants account for 37% of landings value for the 
period of 1984-1991. Participating owners own 12.75% of all sablefish and halibut 
harvesting vessels. On average, higher intensity political participants have higher average 
total landings, in terms of weight and value. This is especially pronounced for meeting 
participants that on average land 4-10x as much as non-participants (Table 7). Overall, 72% 
of the participating vessel owners expressed preferences against ITQs (Table 6). However, 
mode of participation is highly correlated with position. Nearly 40% of observations are 
petition records and almost all petition observations are opposed to ITQ management (98%). 
Conversely, only around 54% of letter writers and 46% of meeting participants oppose, as 
seen in table 6. Table 8 shows the expected difference in expected catch and expected quota 
as a percentage of the total allowable catch for participants and non-participants by each 
round. This is the Diff term described in the data section. For every round except the last, 
participants have a larger difference in expected catch under the two regimes relative to non-
participants. These numbers seem very small, but when multiplied by the total allowable 
catch to get an actual quantity in pounds, the affect is more apparent. Based on 1990 
numbers, a reduction in expected catch of 0.00005% translates to roughly 2,600 pounds of 
halibut ($4700). 
V. Discussion 
Self-interest, influence, and cost are important factors influencing participation in the 
fisheries management process. Expected benefits change as a result of changes to the initial 
allocation formula, and the timing of these benefits also change. As the quota allocation 
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formula changes during the formation process, so do the individual’s expected quota 
allocation and expected future catch. We compare the expected change in benefits of 
participants versus non-participants and find that participants typically have more at stake 
than non-participants. That is, they have on average, a larger difference between expected 
catch and expected quota (Table 8). This is in line with previous empirical literature finding 
self-interest as an important determinant of political participation. 
The amount of influence an individual exerts over the council process is likely 
partially attributable to the mode of participation. Testifying at a public meeting is the most 
visible form of participation, and likely the most influential. The decision making of policy 
makers is more in line with the preferences expressed by meeting participants than other 
types of political participants.20 However, consolidation caps limiting the amount of quota 
that can be held by one individual, and transferability restrictions prohibiting trading of 
permits between vessels in different size classes were included to address concerns 
highlighted by stakeholder input. Consistent with the literature, meeting attendees are larger, 
and therefore likely higher SES, than other types of participants and non-participants. 
The final policy was approved in December 1991, and forwarded to the secretary of 
commerce in April of 1992. As ITQ implementation became more salient in council 
discussions, participation increased. The fourth column in table 5 shows the number of 
participants per year. Throughout the policy formation process, the council made many 
requests to the public for input. Even though the policy was not implemented until 1995, 
participation started to decline with final council adoption in 1992. This likely signaled to 
                                                
20 The ITQ policy was approved even though a majority of political participants opposed the 
policy. 
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stakeholders that the probability of influencing the outcome was significantly reduced.  This 
finding is also in line with previous literature suggesting “closeness” of an election increases 
participation.  
Although we have not yet examined distance in relation to participation, we do 
observe participation rates to be inversely related to the cost of participation. The most 
popular mode of participation, signing a petition, is also the one that requires the least effort. 
Resource models of participation would suggest that writing a letter requires more civic and 
communication skills than signing a petition. We find letter writing to be a less popular 
mode of participation than signing a petition. Attending a meeting is the most costly and 
least common form of participation,  
This paper reviews political participation literature and analyzes political 
participation in the context of the Alaska halibut and sablefish fisheries. The ITQ policy 
formation process is described, and expected determinants of participation are discussed. We 
utilize observable variables in fisheries performance and demographics to examine the 
sources of variation in political participation. Our work demonstrates the importance of self-
interest, influence, and cost in determining political participation. It is important to study 
political participation beyond the context of elections. The social norms that lead to 
participation in electoral politics do not always lead to participation in broader forms of 
political activity (Dalton, 2008).  
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VI. Figures and Tables 
Tables 
Table 1: Timeline of ITQ development 
Year Month Council Action 
1987 December Council states intent to develop LE or ITQ for sablefish fishery. 
1988 December Council to expand and analyze two options for sablefish management: ITQs and license limitation. 
1989 October 
Sablefish Management Alternatives Go to Public 
Review; Halibut ITQ management review scheduled for 
Jan 1990 
1990 January ITQs Considered Preferred Alternative for Sablefish Fixed Gear Management 
1990 April Decision on sablefish ITQ delayed and later tabled. 
1990 December Halibut added to Sablefish ITQ program 
1991 October 
Council approves preferred alternatives for ITQ 
program for the sablefish and halibut fixed gear 
fisheries. 
1991 December Council approves ITQ system for the fixed gear sablefish and halibut fisheries. 
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Table 2: Data Description (Years 1987-1992) 
Source Description Details Managing Agency 
NPFMC 
Meeting 
Minutes 
Minutes of council meetings 
covering proposed changes to 
management.  
Name, location, agency, 
comment, date  NPFMC 
NPFMC 
Newsletters 
Quarterly public newsletter 
providing changes to FMPS and 
agenda items for upcoming 
meetings. Includes upcoming 
events, forums, and fishery news.  
Proposed/Implemented 
changes to FMP NPFMC 
ADFG Fish 
Tickets 
Log of all landings made in the 
state of Alaska.  
ADFG number, species 
landed, weight, value, port, 
year and month of landings 
ADFG 
Alaska State 
Vessel Registry 
Listings of vessels licensed by the 
state of Alaska to participate in 
commercial fishing activities. 
ADFG and file number, 
owner name, address, phone, 
vessel details, years of 
ownership, home-port 
CFEC 
 
Table 3: ITQ Policy Design Details 
Species Time Period Start Date 
Participation 
Requirement 
Qualifying 
Years Quota Calculation 
Sablefish 1987-1988 1991 1984, 1985, 1986 or 1987 1984-1987 
Average or best of 
historic landings. 
Sablefish 1989 1991 1984, 1985, 1986 or 1987 1984-1988 
Average or Best of 
historic landings. 
Halibut and 
Sablefish 1990 1991 
1984, 1985, 
1986, 1987 or 
1988 
1984-1989 
Average of 6 years 
landings, more credit 
for recent participation. 
Halibut and 
Sablefish 
Late 1991-
1995 1993 
1988, 1989, or 
1990 
1984-
1990* 
Best five years from the 
qualifying period. 
*Historical catch of sablefish will be counted from 1985-1990. Historical catch of halibut will be 
counted from 1984 -1990.  
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Table 4: Variable Names and Descriptions 
Variable 
Name Description Calculation 
EC Expected catch Average percent of TAC landed (total weigh) for participating years. 
EQ Expected quota allocation Using formula from table 2.  
Diff Difference in Expected catch and expected quota allocation. Expected Catch-Expected quota allocation 
D Distance Aerial Miles from Anchorage, AK 
City City of Residence City of residence fixed effect. 
Year Year of Observation Year fixed effect. 
Y Participation Measure Binary Variable equal to one if individual participates. 
 
 
Table 5: Position by Year of Comment. 		 Oppose Support Undecided Total 
1982 0 3 0 3 
1987 5 5 4 14 
1988 16 19 15 50 
1989 23 17 32 72 
1990 131 38 11 180 
1991 389 56 8 453 
1992 193 82 3 278 
1993 3 2 0 5 
1994 7 0 2 9 
1995 1 4 1 6 
Total 768 226 76 1,070 
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Table 6: Position by Mode of Participation 	  Oppose Support Undecided Total 
Letter/Written 236 163 32 431 
Petition 464 9 0 473 
Public Testimony 67 54 40 161 
Resolution 3 0 0 3 
Total 770 226 72 1,068 
  72.10% 21.20% 6.70%   
 
Table 7: Average Cumulative Landings (Lbs)* by form and round participation 
  		 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
Sablefish Abstain 30,587 35,791 40,900 41,704 45,814 
 Petition - - - 97,525 62,980 
 Letter 30,549 129,468 51,707 291,351 187,558 
 Public Testimony 387,631 1,395,991 707,962 1,271,375 479,825 
 	 	 	 	 	   	 	 	 	 	  Halibut Abstain 31,836 35,748 39,120 38,353 39,540 
 Petition - - - 256,993 139,159 
 Letter 222,561 109,619 85,267 155,353 175,504 
 Public Testimony 190,846 367,381 263,800 416,195 260,479 
*Cumulative landings are total landings from 1984 up to that point in time 
 
Table 8: Average Difference in Expected Catch and Expected Quota by Participation 		 		 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
Sablefish 
Non-Participant 2.90E-04 3.10E-04 3.40E-04 3.80E-04 4.30E-04 
Participant 5.00E-04 6.40E-04 1.10E-03 8.30E-04 4.10E-04 
Halibut 
Non-Participant 5.60E-05 6.40E-05 7.70E-05 8.10E-05 8.80E-05 
Participant 2.30E-04 2.10E-04 1.80E-04 2.20E-04 1.60E-04 
*Differences calculated as a percent of the total allowable catch 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Example Letter 
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Figure 2: from Dalton, 2008 
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activity over time – hardly evidence of a mass disengagement from politics. There
are no more definitive data on electoral participation than the ANES, and these
data run counter to the impressions gained from lower-quality commercial polls.
When one turns to other forms of political action, the trends are distinctly more
positive. TheWorldValue Survey measures membership in four ‘civic groups’ that
represent new forms of political engagement (environmental groups, women’s
groups, peace groups and a civic association). In 1981 only 6 per cent of
Americans reported that they were a member of one of these four groups; by
1999 this had increased to 33 per cent. The Verba et al. (1995, p. 72) participation
studies in 1967 and 1987 asked about participation in groups addressing a
community issue – the essence of Tocquevillian democracy. The 2000 Social
Capital study replicated this question.Community participation has also increased
from 30 per cent in 1967 to 38 per cent in 2000.
Similarly, signing petitions and participating in more challenging protest activities
display a marked increase from 1975 to the present based on the Political
Action/World Values Survey. Again, this contrasts markedly with the Roper
trends, which indicate a 10 per cent decline in signing petitions over essentially
this same time period (Putnam, 2000). In addition, the question on whether one
protested in the last year that is available from the Verba et al. (1987) survey and
the 2000 Social Capital study describe a steady level of protest activity. If we could
Figure 2: Trends in American Political Participation
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Chapter III 
 
 
The Cost of Efficiency: Consolidation in Alaskan ports after the introduction of fishing 
property rights 
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Abstract: 
Arguments against the adoption of fishery property rights, despite their clear ecological 
and economic benefits, include the redistribution of fishing income away from small 
communities and the increased concentration of fishing effort among fewer vessel owners. 
We examine the extent to which these effects have occurred after the implementation of 
transferable fishery property rights in the Alaskan halibut and sablefish fisheries. We find 
that fishing ports generally do not lose harvesting or processing revenue, but both processors 
and vessel owners consolidate, and fewer fish are delivered to the home ports of vessel 
owners. As a result, small coastal cities where halibut and sablefish are landed see a reduced 
number of vessel owners and overall population declines. While there is reason to believe 
that this realignment may create substantial aggregate welfare gains, our results offer a 
partial explanation to the political opposition to transferable property rights to fish. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In natural resource management, the reallocation of property rights to eliminate open 
access losses is often met with resistance, and often inefficient institutions persist. When 
changes in policy also result in a change in distribution of wealth, even the most efficient 
policies can be politically infeasible. In many settings, successful policy adoption requires a 
trade-off between efficiency and distribution. In a common pool resource setting, the 
transition to secure, tradeable property rights can be economically beneficial and improve 
the health of the resource, but is often met with resistance. Cap-and-trade for CO2 emissions 
may be opposed by industry, environmental groups, and others who perceive costs from the 
more efficient regulatory regime negatively affecting them (Stavins 1998). The 
redistribution of water from agricultural to urban and environmental purposes is opposed by 
rural communities who claim such transfers cripple local economies (Edwards and Libecap 
2016; Hanak 2005). 
Similarly, in fisheries the switch from regulated open access to tradable property 
rights has been opposed (Grainger and Parker 2013). A variety of property rights based 
management are used in fisheries: territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs); individual 
transferable and non-transferable quotas (ITQs and IQs); cooperative and community fishing 
rights; and entry licenses. An ITQ program typically defines property rights in harvesting 
volume as a percentage of the total allowable catch. ITQ rights are often exclusive, 
permanent, secure, and transferable. Because an individual is given decision making power 
and ownership over the resource, harvesters adjust effort and fishing capital to capture their 
allocated quota at a minimum cost (Arnason, 2006). The ITQ harvester can also change the 
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timing and location of landings in response to market conditions or to increase product 
quality.  
However, ITQs have encountered a considerable amount political opposition despite 
their well-documented improvements of harvesting efficiency and fishery health. Analysis 
of nearly 4,000 letters stating opinions on fishing property rights in Alaska indicates the loss 
of fishing income to rural ports and the consolidation of fishing wealth are key concerns of 
fishermen, crew, seafood processors, and community leaders and members prior to their 
implementation (Sutherland 2016). Aggregate efficiency gains after ITQ introduction are 
expected in the harvesting sector (Weninger 2008; Weninger & Waters 2003). ITQs increase 
fleet efficiency through three mechanisms: reducing restrictions on the harvesting sector; 
consolidation of more harvesting activities under the lowest cost (most efficient) operators; 
and the additional flexibility for vessels to exploit scale economies in production (Lian et al 
2009). 
While it is widely acknowledged that fishery property rights increase the efficiency 
by which the resource is extracted, the distribution of gains under the new management 
regime is not well understood. Prior work has primarily focused on the theoretical drivers of 
consolidation and empirical analysis of the extent to which fleets increase technical 
efficiency in production as a result (e.g. Lian et al 2009; Grafton et al; Reimer et al 2014), 
There has not been statistical analysis of the effects of these changes on individual fishing 
communities. Similarly, there has not been statistical analysis of processor response to the 
introduction of property rights at the community level. If ITQ skepticism centers around 
these effects, then it is critical to understand to what extent this opposition is grounded in 
empirical reality. 
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This paper addresses the effect of ITQ implementation at the community level by 
examining the effect of the 1995 introduction of property rights in the Alaskan sablefish and 
halibut fisheries. It examines how the number of processors and harvesters, the overall 
revenue from both sectors, the allocation of deliveries to local ports, and population changed 
as a result of the changing management regime. We present a simple analytical framework 
to explain why transferable quotas are expected to increase the concentration of fishing 
income among a smaller number of vessels and processors. We use a novel dataset, 
constructed by merging data on fish deliveries with vessel and owner information, to test the 
changes using a difference-in-difference approach. We demonstrate that while fishing and 
processing revenues do appear to increase slightly or remain constant overall, property right 
introduction has large effects: (1) both the harvesting and processing sectors consolidate; (2) 
vessel owners deliver less to their home ports; and (3) the population of small halibut and 
sablefish ports declines. We conclude by arguing that these changes, while potentially 
increasing efficiency, are also likely to lead to opposition prior to and dissatisfaction after 
implementation among certain groups. 
 
II. Background 
Consolidation and Opposition 
Institutional arrangements that reduce common pool losses, such as secure, 
transferable property rights will only arise if politically feasible. The amount of political 
conflict will partly depend on the concentration of wealth under the proposed and current 
share distribution (Libecap, 1993 pgs 24, 28). When some parties are made worse off under 
new allocation of rights, they may oppose adoption and implementation. Local fishing 
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communities have opposed ITQs over concern that ITQs will lead to fleet consolidation and 
a loss of jobs (Grainger & Parker, 2013). The observed structure of post-ITQ fisheries 
confirms some community and industry concerns. Under ITQ management without trading 
restrictions, quota sales result in a smaller, more efficient fleet as compared to regulated 
open access without entry restrictions (Reimer et al 2014). 
Ex-ante analysis shows cost savings resulting from ITQ programs can largely be 
attributed to fishery consolidation through exit of inefficient vessels (Lian et al. 2010, 
Weninger 2008, Weninger & Waters 2003). These predictions have been confirmed in ex-
post analysis finding cost savings achieved through consolidation (Grafton et al. 2000). 
Small, local operations may benefit from traditional regulation, while larger operations have 
more consistent and larger catch over time, and are often the biggest advocates of limited 
entry (Sutherland 2016). The New Zealand quota management system (QMS), adopted in 
1986, resulted in fleet downsizing with exiting vessels being predominantly small-scale 
fishers (Stewart et al, 2006). Massive fleet consolidation in the Icelandic cod quota system 
resulted in public naming of quota holders as “Lords of the Sea” (Pálsson and Helgason 
1995). A reduction in fleet size concentrates vessel revenue, and results in broader impacts 
in fishing industry employment. When the Canadian halibut fishery adopted ITQs, 
efficiency increased but landings shifted and dropped as much as 12% in some ports as their 
freezing facilities became unnecessary, and the number of crew-members employed dropped 
by 32% (Casey et al., 1995). In the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands crab fisheries, the reduction 
in fishery employment after ITQ implementation was proportional to the number of vessels 
exiting the fleet (Abbott et al, 2010).  
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Due to potential distributional impacts of fleet consolidation, most of the current ITQ 
programs restrict trading of quota within vessel classes and cap consolidation of quota. The 
owners of the grandfathered quota are typically allowed to sell quota with restrictions aimed 
at maintaining diversity and limiting consolidation of the fleet. Prior research shows how 
ITQ design affects the distribution of benefits among and within sectors (Matulich and 
Sever, 1999; Costello and Grainger, 2015). However, there is little empirical analysis. 
Empirical Setting 
Commercial harvest of halibut can be traced back to the early 1900s, and the fishery 
mostly produced fresh-fish until the 1970s (Homans and Wilen, 2005). Higher halibut prices 
in the 1970s and the implementation of limited entry programs for salmon fisheries 
contributed to the growing number of vessels entering the halibut fishery.  During the 1980s, 
the halibut fishery received an influx of larger crabbing vessels as crab stocks declined 
(Shotton, 2001). Even as the total allowable catch stayed steady or increased, the season 
length shortened due to an increasing number of vessels entering the fishery (Willam et al., 
2009). The halibut fishery experienced growth when other fisheries experienced low years, 
and the relatively low cost of entry into the fishery also made the halibut attractive as a 
“supplemental” fishery. By 1992 the halibut season had been reduced to two or three one-
day openings.  
After the creation of the exclusive economics zone in 1976, the US sablefish 
experienced enormous growth. Similar to the halibut fishery, the sablefish fishery attracted 
an increasing number of vessels from 1980 to 1990. The council first adopted allocative 
measures for sablefish in 1985, when the total allowable catch was split between geographic 
areas and gear types (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997), but the advent of new fishing technology, 
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increasing vessel size, and increased entry led to further growth of the sablefish fishery. 
Season length regulations were implemented in the fishery, and the sablefish season had 
been reduced from 180 days to 20 days in some areas. As a result of over-capitalization and 
increased entry, regulators suggested ITQs as a potential management regime for sablefish 
in the late 1980s. During the policy formation period of the sablefish ITQ, similar concerns 
in the halibut fishery led to the two fisheries being combined in the implementation of the 
policy in 1995. 
The halibut and sablefish fisheries often overlap, as both require use of longline gear 
and similar vessels. However, sablefish are harvested further off the coast at depths of 
1300ft, requiring larger vessels and more specialized gear than halibut harvesting. Halibut 
are a flatfish caught in waters as shallow as 90 feet, allowing vessels as small as skiffs to 
harvest halibut close to shore. Sablefish vessels are on average larger than halibut vessels, 
and a few large vessel operators target exclusively sablefish. Most of these fishers operate 
vessels 60 feet or more in length, enabling them to fish in less-protected areas, such as the 
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (Willman et al., 2009). Fewer barriers to entry exist in the 
halibut fishery leading to a more severe derby setting under regulated open access 
management. For this reason, the halibut fishery is expected to respond more to the 
introduction of property rights. 
Pre-ITQ command and control regulations resulted in a race to fish in which vessels 
and gear were chosen to maximize quantity harvested in a short time period (Homens and 
Wilen 2005). The number of vessel owners participating in the halibut fishery grew from 
2,479 in 1985 to its maximum of 4,161 in 1991. For sablefish, the annual number of vessel 
owners ranged from 820 in 1990 to 1,271 in 1994.  As a response to over-capitalization and 
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safety concerns, ITQ programs were floated for the sablefish and halibut fisheries during the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. The ITQ programs were finally implemented in 1995, with 
initial allocation of quota based on average fishery landings during the qualifying period 
1984 through 1990. Like most other ITQ programs, the Alaska halibut sablefish ITQ 
program included quota trading restrictions and ownership caps. Quota trading restrictions 
and concentration caps are more stringent for the halibut fishery, but in both fisheries 
considerable opportunity for consolidation existed under the ITQ rules. From 1994 to 1997 
the number of vessel owners dropped for both fisheries by about 46%. During the same 
period, total ex-vessel revenues increased by 29% for halibut and 16% for sablefish. As 
revenues increased, the number of individuals receiving the revenue decreased. Figure 1 
shows the total number of vessel owners from 1990 to 2000. Figure 2 shows the total 
revenue over time, and Figure 3 the per-harvester revenue. 
III. Model 
We begin by examining the effect of a transition from regulated open access to ITQ 
management. In this transition we assume the total allowable catch (TAC) is set in a manner 
that does not change when ITQs are introduced. In any period, a vessel has harvest 𝑦!. We 
assume harvest follows the Schaefer representation where: 𝑦! = 𝑞𝑒!𝑋 where q is the 
catchability coefficient, X is the stock of biomass, and 𝑒! is the level of effort. Given an 
identical set of some unknown number of harvesters, N: 
 𝑇𝐴𝐶 = 𝑁𝑦! = 𝑁𝑞𝑒!𝑋 (
1) 
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Therefore, 𝑒! = !"#!"# and 𝑦! = !"#! . Under regulated open access given an ex-vessel price 
p and a cost of effort function 𝑐(𝑒!),  rents are dissipated so that: 
 𝜋! = 𝑝𝑦! − 𝑐 𝑒! = 𝑝𝑞𝑒!𝑋 − 𝑐 𝑒! = 0 (
2) 
Under ITQs: 
 
𝜕𝜋!𝜕𝑒! = 𝑝𝑞𝑋 − 𝑐′ 𝑒! = 0 (3) 
Then 𝑒!!" satisfies the average cost condition: 
 
𝑐 𝑒!𝑒! =  𝑝𝑞𝑋 (4) 
While 𝑒!!"# satisfies the marginal cost condition: 
 
𝜕𝑐 𝑒!𝜕𝑒! =  𝑝𝑞𝑋 (5) 
Therefore, 𝑒!!" < 𝑒!!"#, implying that 𝑁!" > 𝑁!"#. This leads to prediction (i): The 
harvesting sector consolidates after ITQs are implemented. 
Fleet consolidation results in fewer vessels participating in the fishery. These vessels 
take longer to catch the TAC, and therefore the rate of deliveries to processors decreases. 
Let 𝑧! be the quantity of fish processed by one of M identical processors. Under regulated 
open access the number of processors, 𝑀!" satisfies the condition of long-run average cost 
equaling marginal cost: 
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 𝑐(𝑧!)𝑧! = 𝜕𝑐(𝑧!)𝜕𝑧!  (6) 
 If this condition were not satisfied, another processing firm could enter and earn 
profits. This conditions restricts the number of processors even under competitive 
equilibrium. Even though the firms are price takers, they must be large enough to reach the 
minimum efficient scale, limiting the number of firms. When ITQs are introduced, deliveries 
occur over a period T times longer than before. Therefore, the number of processors, 𝑀!"# 
satisfies the condition: 
 𝑐 !!!!!! = 𝜕𝑐 𝑧!𝜕𝑧!  
(
7) 
 That is, the quantity determining the minimum efficient scale in the processor cost 
function under regulated open access was delivered over a short period, and if the quantity is 
delivered over a longer period, more must be delivered for the processor to reach the 
minimum efficient scale. This leads to prediction (ii): The processing sector consolidates 
after the introduction of ITQs. 
 Under regulated open access, there are a large number of vessels catching relatively 
small amounts of fish. For these vessel owners, the fixed cost of traveling to a destination 
remote from their city of residence to fish or deliver product—for instance to a processor 
offering a higher price—might not be worthwhile. However, after consolidation vessel 
owners prosecute more fish on average, so that incurring the cost of remote operations may 
prove profitable. The leads to prediction (iii): Vessel owners make fewer deliveries to their 
home ports after ITQ introduction.  
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An element of the inefficiency of regulated open access is excess labor input. In 
small communities whose economies are tied to halibut and sablefish prosecution, a 
decrease in the number of owners and processing plants will cause a downward shift in the 
labor demand curve relative to other locations, causing outward migration to seek alternative 
employment. This leads to prediction (iv): Small community populations decline as a result 
of ITQ introduction. 
IV. Data and Empirical Strategy 
Data 
The variables used in our data set represent potential indicators of changes in 
revenue flows, industry structure and community well-being. These measures are 
constructed using the Alaskan Vessel Registry, Alaska Department of Fish and Game 
(ADFG) fish tickets, and the Commercial Operators Annual Report (COAR). Vessel owners 
in the state of Alaska are required to register their vessel in a database. A unique file number 
identifies every individual or entity owning a vessel, and vessels are given a unique vessel 
number. The number of vessels harvesting halibut or sablefish varied by year, peaking in 
1990-1991 and decreasing over the sample period. When harvesters land fish in Alaska, they 
are required by law to fill out fish tickets, providing vessel and catch information including 
vessel number, date, and weight and value landed. An additional dataset, COAR, tracks both 
ex-vessel landings and price, as well as the wholesale weight and price of products sold by 
processor. This ex-vessel data is less reliable than fish ticket data, but is the only source of 
data for processors. This dataset is used to track the number and revenue of processors 
through the period 1990-2000. 
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Landings data are linked to the vessel registry using unique vessel number (ADFG 
number), making it possible to track the harvest and location of all vessel owners that 
participate in the fishery over the study period. The unit of observation is the port/city, and 
location and value of fish landings are tracked by city of residence of the vessel owner. For 
each Alaskan port city, we construct a variety of measures used to estimate halibut and 
sablefish revenue flows through processors, vessel owners and fish landings. 
Table 1 describes the variables used in the empirical analysis, and all variables 
except the last three are calculated for each fishery of interest, e.g. each port has a count of 
halibut processors and of sablefish processors. Variables include: the number and total 
revenue of processors by port city; and the number, total revenue, and average revenue of 
vessel owners by city of residence. We construct a measure of the percent of catch delivered 
to home port by taking the amount of catch caught by residents of a city compared to what 
they deliver there. To measure community effects of ITQs, we utilize the “Alaska Taxable” 
data from Department of Community and Regional Affairs for years 1990-2000. This 
provides us with annual population measures of 355 Alaskan cities and communities. 
Finally, we construct two dummy variables. First, we construct an ITQ indicator if the 
year is after 1994. Second, we use vessel ownership and harvest data to categorize cities as a 
halibut ports (=1) or not (=0). If vessel owners harvesting halibut reside in a given city for 
all years in the pre-ITQ period (1990-94), they are categorized as halibut cities. The set of 
sablefish cities is contained in the halibut set, so the halibut set is used exclusively. 
Empirical Strategy 
We test four predictions: (i) harvester consolidation, (ii) processor consolidation, (iii) 
fewer home port deliveries, and (iv) population declines in halibut port cities. We employ a 
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difference-in-difference estimation strategy with observations at the city/port level. The 
baseline/counterfactual fishery is pacific cod. This fishery was selected for several reasons. 
First, wholesale pacific cod is a substitute for sablefish (also called black cod) and halibut 
and therefore will be sensitive to changing market dynamics. Second, pacific cod was and 
continues to be a regulated open access fishery and its management did not change in 1995. 
Third, pacific cod is harvested using trawl, longline, and pot gear, which overlaps with the 
primarily pot gear used to prosecute sablefish in the Bering Sea and longline gear used to 
prosecute halibut as well as sablefish in the Aleutians and Gulf of Alaska (Witherell and 
Peterson 2011). Equation 8 provides the general form of the data analysis. The log of the 
variable of interest is regressed on dummy variables for fishery type and ITQ while 
controlling for year fixed effects, any variation affecting all ports within a given year: 
 log Y! = σ + γ! ∙ I! + δ! ∙ I!"# ∙ I!!∈{!,!} + τ! + u! (8) 
 Here, σ is the baseline effect of the counterfactual fishery, while the baseline effect 
of ITQ introduction is absorbed by the year fixed effects. The dummy variables I! are one 
when an observation is from a given fishery, where 𝑓 ∈ {𝐻, 𝑆} represents halibut and 
sablefish fisheries, and zero otherwise. The coefficient γ! controls for the pre-ITQ 
difference between halibut or sablefish and pacific cod, prior to ITQ introduction. To test 
prediction (ii) we regress measures of processor consolidation—processor revenue by city 
and number of processors—in equation 8. The coefficient on the interaction between I!"# 
and I!, the post ITQ effect on a fishery, halibut or sablefish, relative to pacific cod is of 
interest. While there is not a clear prediction on total revenue, we expect that for the log of 
the number of processors δ will be significant and negative. 
  86 
 To test hypothesis (i), harvester measures—total vessel owner revenue, average 
vessel owner revenue per city, number of vessel owners per city—are regressed. Again, 
there is not a clear prediction for δ on total revenue, but number of owners is expected to be 
negative, and average revenue per owner is expected to be positive. More robust 
specifications control for city/port fixed effects, the variation through time that is unique to a 
port, p!, and port specific time trend, t ∙ p!, as shown in equation 9. 
 log Y! = σ + γ! ∙ I! + δ! ∙ I!"# ∙ I!!∈{!,!} + τ! + p! + t ∙ p! + u! (9) 
 To test prediction (iii) the same specification is used but with the dependent variable 
being proportion of catch delivered to home port with no log transformation. The prediction 
here is that δ will be negative, especially for halibut, as fewer deliveries are made to home 
ports. Finally, equation 10 shows a test for prediction (iv). Here the proportion of a city’s 
1990 population is regressed on a dummy for if the port has residents who fish halibut in 
every year 1990-94. 
 P! = σ + α ∙ I!"# + β ∙ I!"#$ + σ ∙ I!!" ∙ I!"#$ + τ! + p! + u! (
10) 
When τ! is controlled for with a year dummy, the variable I!"# is dropped. p! 
controls for port fixed effects. The coefficient σ will be negative if halibut ports lose 
population relative to non-halibut ports post ITQ introduction. 
V. Results 
The implementation of ITQs in the Alaskan halibut and sablefish fisheries brought 
about dramatic changes in the number of participants and distribution of revenue among 
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fishing industry members. Reductions in the number of vessel owners, active vessels, and 
processing plants were accompanied by a relative decrease in population for small, fishery-
dependent communities. Table 3 shows the pre- and post-ITQ means of the two species of 
interest, halibut and sablefish, as well as pacific cod which did not undergo any regulatory 
change. These statistics indicate that Wholesale Revenue, Mean Owner Revenue, and Mean 
Average Owner Revenue increased in treated fisheries, but only Wholesale Revenue 
increased in the untreated fishery. Similarly, Number of Processors, Mean Number of 
Owners, and Mean Home-Port Deliveries decreased for treated fisheries, but increased or 
stayed the same for the untreated fishery. While this table is consistent with our hypotheses, 
it is indicative only. To more rigorously show these results, we turn to statistical tests. 
 Prediction (i) states the harvesting sector consolidates after ITQs are implemented. 
Tables 4a and 4b shows the effect of ITQs on a city’s total and average owner revenue 
received from halibut or sablefish harvesting. Specifications (1-4) examine the effect of 
ITQs on city total revenue. Though the signs on the coefficients interacting ITQ and halibut 
or sablefish are positive, the result is only significant for sablefish when omitting port fixed 
effects and port time trend. Consistent with the prediction, average revenue per owner 
significantly increases for both halibut and sablefish vessel owners post-ITQs. Average 
owner revenue increases by 120% for Halibut and 94% for Sablefish. 
Table 5 provides regression results for tests of Predictions (i) and (iii). The sign on 
the coefficient of the ITQ interaction term is consistently negative for both halibut and 
sablefish, indicating the number of operating vessel owners per city decreases when ITQs 
are implemented. The halibut result is significant for all specifications, and significant at the 
1 percent level when year and city fixed effects and a port time trend are included. The 
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coefficient on the halibut ITQ interaction term indicates the number of owners under ITQ 
management declined to 68.3% of the pre-ITQ total. The coefficient on sablefish ITQ is 
only significant in specification (2) which includes year and city fixed effects. The number 
of sablefish owners declined to 80.7% of the pre-ITQ total. 
Figure 4 shows the mean home port deliveries for sablefish and halibut cities, 
indicating a decrease for halibut around 1995. Sablefish also decreases after 1995 after 
increasing for the early years of the 1990s. Specifications (4) and (5) of table 5 provide 
results for test of prediction (iii), vessel owners make fewer deliveries to their home ports 
after ITQ introduction. The sign on the ITQ-species interaction terms is consistently 
negative and significant at the one percent level for both halibut and sablefish. This implies 
vessel owners are less likely to deliver to the port at their city of residence post ITQ 
implementation. Prior to ITQs, halibut vessel owners delivered 72% of their catch to their 
home port, and sablefish vessel owners delivered about 55% of catch home. Under ITQ 
management, halibut and sablefish vessel owners reduced the percent of their total catch 
delivered to home port by 7.5 and 5 percentage points, respectively.  
The processing sector also experiences a reduction in number of firms following ITQ 
implementation. Figure 5 shows the mean trend in number of processors consistent with 
prediction (ii): sablefish and, more dramatically, halibut ports see decreases in the number of 
processors around the time the ITQ policy was implemented. Tables 6a and 6b provide 
results for analysis performed on the fish processing sector.  Prediction (ii), the processing 
sector consolidates after the introduction of ITQs is tested in specifications (1-4). The sign 
on the ITQ interaction term is consistently negative and significant at the 5 or 1 percent 
levels. The number of plants per city processing halibut is reduced by 15.3% after ITQs. 
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Similarly, the number of sablefish processors is reduced to 78.7% of pre-ITQ total. ITQs do 
not significantly change total processor revenue. 
ITQ induced fishery and industry changes, including reductions in number of active 
vessels, vessel owners, and processing plants, have consequences for small, coastal 
communities. Figure 6 shows the average population of Alaskan cities under 500 people, by 
whether a vessel owner in the city lands halibut or not, scaled by the 1990 average city 
population. Post-ITQ, the population of halibut cities declines relative to the population of 
other cities. Table 7 provides results of statistical analysis performed on small community 
populations. Prediction (iv), which states small community populations decline as a result of 
ITQ introduction, is tested using specifications (1-5). Communities are classified as “halibut 
cities” if for every year prior to ITQs, at least one city resident owned a vessel that harvested 
halibut. The effect of ITQs on community population is tested for three population size 
categories of cities: less than 500, less than 1000, and less than 5000 individuals. 
Specifications (1-3) test the effect of ITQs on population of cities of less than 500 
individuals and is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. The effect of ITQs on cities 
of less than 1000 individuals, specification (4), is similar to the effect of ITQs on cities of 
less than 500 individuals. However, the effect is stronger for smaller cities, with a 
coefficient value of -0.15, indicating small cities where halibut vessel owners live have 15 
percent less population relative to the baseline population in 1990. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper we find that fishing ports generally do not lose harvesting or processing 
revenue as a result of ITQs. Rather, processors and vessel owners consolidate, and fewer 
fish are delivered to the home ports of vessel owners. As a result, small coastal cities where 
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halibut and sablefish are landed see a decline in vessel owners and overall population. Fleet 
consolidation is accompanied by reduced demand for crew, vessel, and port related services. 
Communities experiencing reduced number of owners lose both fishing owner revenue and 
vessel-related employment opportunities, likely causing overall population declines when 
outside employment options are limited.  
Quantifying the impacts of ITQs on industry structure and communities provides 
insight in to why these institutions are not more prevalent. Community and industry 
members may lose under certain policy designs and will likely oppose its implementation. 
The Seafood industry is a substantial part of Alaska’s economy. Though there are only about 
10,000 vessels operating in Alaska in any given year, the seafood industry as a whole 
employed 78,519 individuals in 2008 (MCA, 2009). ITQs affect employment at the 
harvesting level and have impacts on downstream industry structure. There have been claims 
that ITQs directly affect communities, but this claim has not been rigorously examined 
empirically. ITQs often face opposition prior to and dissatisfaction after implementation. 
There is a general consensus that property rights based management in fisheries offers 
benefits in terms of cost savings, stock health, etc, but social consequences of ITQs are still 
a highly disputed issue (Thébaud et al., 2012).  
Understanding downstream and community impacts of ITQs can assist in the design 
of management institutions, reduce the amount of opposition and the length of time to 
implementation, and improve overall implementation efficiency. Efficiency gains afforded 
by ITQs result in redistribution of wealth and consolidation in both the harvesting and 
processing sectors. This paper confirms the anticipated consolidation resulting from ITQs, 
and further links ITQ implementation to population changes in small, coastal communities. 
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While there is reason to believe that this realignment may create substantial gains, our 
results offer a partial explanation to the intense political opposition to transferable property 
rights to fish catch. Policy can be designed to minimize these effects. For instance, 
consolidation caps and transfer restrictions prevent the fleet from consolidating to its least 
cost size. While these may improve community buy-in, they also entail, and should be 
weighed against, the potentially significant efficiency costs. Side-payments in the form of 
community quota allocations may also improve public buy-in. Although both consolidation 
caps and community allocation were part of the sablefish and halibut ITQ design, 
consolidation and community effects still occur.  However, voluntary exit from the 
harvesting sector does not in itself imply any one is worse off. In fact the exiting fisher gets 
compensation in the form of payment for her quota. The indirect employment effects of 
harvester exit on communities and processors are real and need to be accounted for in policy 
design to achieve political feasibility. 
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VIII. Tables and Figures 
 
Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Name Description Source 
Owner Revenue Total sales of a species by residents of a city/port Fish tickets 
Wholesale 
Revenue 
Total sales of processed fish in a 
port COAR 
Number of 
Owners 
Total owners fishing a species 
who reside in a city/port in a year Fish tickets/registry 
Number of 
Processors 
Total processing plants in a port 
in a year COAR 
Average Owner 
Revenue 
Owner Revenue / Number of 
Owners by city Fish tickets/registry 
Home-Port 
Deliveries 
Port average of the percentage of 
landed pounds each individual 
delivered to their home port 
Fish tickets/registry 
Population Port/city population 
Alaska Department of 
Community and Regional 
Affairs 
ITQ Dummy =1 if year>1994 
	
Halibut Port 
Dummy 
=1 if port has a halibut vessel 
owner every year 1990-94 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
  Halibut Sablefish Pacific Cod 
Wholesale 
Revenue 
24,500,000 11,600,000 56,400,000 
(69,800,000) (24,300,000) (210,000,000) 
Number of 
Processors 
2.40 2.18 2.18 
(2.00) (1.85) (2.01) 
Mean Owner 
Revenue 
2,642,790 4,017,501 2,061,796 
(7,139,606) (7,289,831) (5,262,507) 
Mean Average 
Owner Revenue 
27,416 84,259 34,772 
(37,355) (86,074) (74,211) 
Mean Number 
of Owners 
61.75 32.03 30.28 
(85.26) (43.68) (46.78) 
Mean Home-
Port Deliveries 
0.70 0.60 0.79 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
Table 3: Pre- and Post-ITQ mean comparisons 
	 	 			 Halibut Sablefish Pacific Cod 
		 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
Wholesale 
Revenue 
22,400,000 26,000,000 11,100,000 12,000,000 31,300,000 76,400,000 
(61,700,000) (75,400,000) (25,400,000) (23,500,000) (98,100,000) (266,000,000) 
Number of 
Processors 
2.57 2.28 2.35 2.04 2.05 2.28 
(2.13) (1.89) (2.10) (1.61) (2.04) (1.99) 
Mean 
Owner 
Revenue 
2,005,552 3,113,940 2,844,376 5,202,974 2,064,124 2,059,807 
(3,714,786) (8,840,533) (5,220,666) (8,777,405) (4,588,503) (5,795,438) 
Mean 
Average 
Owner 
Revenue 
15,883 35,944 50,279 118,597 42,859 27,859 
(12,705) (46,276) (40,885) (104,475) (97,729) (44,671) 
Mean 
Number of 
Owners 
84.20 45.14 34.88 29.15 30.25 30.30 
(102.91) (64.86) (46.72) (40.43) (40.40) (51.78) 
Mean 
Home-Port 
Deliveries 
0.75 0.67 0.63 0.58 0.79 0.79 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
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Table 4a: Revenue regressions by vessel owner city (1990-2000) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Log Revenue Log Revenue Log Revenue Log Revenue 
         
Halibut 2.861*** 3.510*** 3.589*** 	(0.639) (0.606) (0.624) 
	
Sablefish 2.922*** 3.085*** 3.102*** 	(0.679) (0.678) (0.698) 
	
Both 	 	 	
3.328*** 
	 	 	
(0.613) 
ITQ x Halibut 0.222 0.448 0.385 	(0.445) (0.382) (0.356) 
	
ITQ x Sablefish 0.983* 0.608 0.585 	(0.521) (0.390) (0.431) 
	
ITQ x Both 	 	 	
0.534 
	 	 	
(0.349) 
	 	 	 	 	Observations 810 810 810 810 
R-squared 0.225 0.676 0.707 0.674 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Port FE No Yes Yes Yes 
 No No Yes No 
Port Time Trend         
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4b: Revenue regressions by vessel owner city (1990-2000) 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Log Average Revenue 
Log Average 
Revenue 
Log Average 
Revenue 
Log Average 
Revenue 
         
Halibut 1.978*** 2.044*** 2.078*** 	(0.499) (0.477) (0.497) 
	
Sablefish 2.628*** 2.824*** 2.857*** 	(0.561) (0.561) (0.574) 
	
Both 	 	 	
2.381*** 
	 	 	
(0.514) 
ITQ x Halibut 0.592** 0.857*** 0.792*** 	(0.279) (0.249) (0.246) 
	
ITQ x Sablefish 0.866*** 0.712** 0.665** 	(0.315) (0.281) (0.309) 
	
ITQ x Both 	 	 	
0.746*** 
	 	 	
(0.236) 
	 	 	 	 	Observations 810 810 810 810 
R-squared 0.318 0.652 0.667 0.637 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Port FE No Yes Yes Yes 
 No No Yes No 
Port Time 
Trend         
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Number of owners and deliveries to home port by vessel owner city (1990-
2000) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Log Count Log Count Log Count Log Count Percent Home 
Percent 
Home 
 
	 	 	 	 	 	Halibut 0.947*** 1.221*** 1.282*** 
	
-0.0493*** 
	
 (0.186) (0.131) (0.120) 
	
(0.00100) 
	Sablefish 0.0154 -0.109 -0.114 
	
-0.165*** 
	
 (0.200) (0.189) (0.197) 
	
(0.00144) 
	Both 
	 	 	
0.643*** 
	
-0.0990*** 
 
	 	 	
(0.131) 
	
(0.00334) 
ITQxHalibut -0.399* -0.325* -0.420*** 
	
-0.0751*** 
	
 (0.204) (0.184) (0.150) 
	
(0.00159) 
	ITQxSablefish -0.119 -0.218* -0.211 
	
-0.0499*** 
	
 (0.158) (0.129) (0.141) 
	
(0.00194) 
	ITQxBoth 
	 	 	
-0.178 
	
-0.0580*** 
 
	 	 	
(0.147) 
	
(0.00325) 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Observations 748 748 748 748 810 810 
R-squared 0.106 0.816 0.847 0.694 0.964 0.719 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Port FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Port Time 
Trend No No Yes No Yes No 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6a: Regressions by processor city (1990-2000) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Log Count Log Count Log Count Log Count 
  
	 	 	 	Halibut 0.193** 0.331*** 0.336*** 
	
	
(0.0822) (0.0797) (0.0828) 
	Sablefish 0.122** 0.131** 0.134** 
	
	
(0.0525) (0.0510) (0.0528) 
	Both 
	 	 	
0.239*** 
	 	 	 	
(0.0621) 
ITQ x Halibut -0.193*** -0.133** -0.137** 
	
	
(0.0694) (0.0598) (0.0593) 
	ITQ x Sablefish -0.180** -0.172*** -0.174*** 
	
	
(0.0676) (0.0621) (0.0649) 
	ITQ x Both 
	 	 	
-0.151*** 
	 	 	 	
(0.0565) 
	 	 	 	 	Observations 979 979 979 979 
R-squared 0.010 0.781 0.816 0.764 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Port FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Port Time Trend No No Yes No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6b: Regressions by processor city (1990-2000) 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Log Revenue Log Revenue Log Revenue Log Revenue 
  
	 	 	 	Halibut 1.213 2.577*** 2.616*** 
	
	
(0.749) (0.696) (0.731) 
	Sablefish 1.297 1.383 1.325 
	
	
(0.788) (0.830) (0.855) 
	Both 
	 	 	
2.073*** 
	 	 	 	
(0.736) 
ITQ x Halibut 0.141 0.300 0.284 
	
	
(0.570) (0.496) (0.534) 
	ITQ x Sablefish -0.139 0.0389 0.105 
	
	
(0.560) (0.519) (0.556) 
	ITQ x Both 
	 	 	
0.128 
	 	 	 	
(0.471) 
	 	 	 	 	Observations 907 907 907 907 
R-squared 0.034 0.584 0.620 0.558 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Port FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Port Time Trend No No Yes No 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Consolidation in halibut and sablefish harvesting 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Ex-vessel revenue 
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Figure 3: Mean revenue per harvester 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Home port deliveries 
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Figure 5: Consolidation in halibut and sablefish processing
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Mean proportion of 1990 population in cities under 500 people 
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